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RENT APPROPRIATION AND THE LABOR LAW
DOCTRINE OF SUCCESSORSHIP
KEITH N. HYLTON*
MARIA O'BREN HYLTON**

I.

INTRODUCTION

When there is a change of corporate control in a business enterprise a
question arises as to whether the new employer should be bound by the predecessor's collective bargaining relationship with the union representing the
predecessor's employees. This is known as the successorship problem in
labor law.' Successorship doctrine is complex and controversial. Several
commentators have attempted to reconcile Supreme Court decisions and to
ascertain the assumptions underlying the Court's opinions in this area.2 This
* Assistant Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; Research Fellow,
American Bar Foundation; A.B. Harvard University; Ph.D. (Economics), Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; J.D. Harvard Law School. The support of the Corporate
Counsel Center at Northwestern is gratefully acknowledged.
** Assistant Professor, De Paul College of Law; A.B. Harvard University, J.D. Yale
Law School. The Authors thank Charlotte Crane, Mark Grady, Henry Perritt, Phillip
Schreiber, Steve Siegel, Morrison Torrey, David Van Zandt, and David Westfall for
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Christine Reidy, Phillip Schreiber, and
Nicole Greenidge-Hoskins provided able research assistance.
I The term successorship defines an employer's legal status and obligations when that
employer acquires all or part of an existing business and maintains "substantial
continuity of identity in the business." John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S.
543, 551 (1964). More generally, the term "successor" refers to an employer who
acquires ownership of the business enterprise whether by stock purchase, merger or
acquisition of assets.
For purposes of simplification, "successor" is used to describe an employer who
obtains control of a business by virtue of a simple change in ownership.
2

E.g., J. ATLESON, VALUES

AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW

160-70

(1983) (identifying the inconsistencies present in the Court's opinions and labeling the
area of successorship jurisprudence as "excruciatingly complex"); Benetar, Successorship
Liability Under Labor Agreements, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1026, 1036-37 (emphasizing
national labor relations policy to balance conflicting interests by establishing rights and
duties of the employment relationship rather than by automatically imposing a duty
on successor employers to honor a predecessor's union contract); Doppelt, Successor
Companies: The NLRB Limits the Options--and Raises Some Problems, 20 DE PAUL L.
REV. 176, 179 (1971) (arguing that successorship rules should promote stable industrial
relations by not requiring employees to demonstrate continually their union desires);
Morris & Gaus, Successorship and the Collective BargainingAgreement: Accommodating
Wiley and Burns, 59 VA. L. REV. 1359, 1383-85 (1973) (reconciling case law by
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Article does not attempt to do this, although paradoxically, the arguments
presented may lead to reconciliation of many of the Supreme Court's decisions relating to successorship. Instead, this Article examines the theoretical
basis for a successorship rule.
Previous writing in this area has assumed that because successorship obligations will almost always attach if a majority of the predecessor's employees are retained, successorship doctrine's justification rests in its ability to
provide a more stable regime for the expression and realization of employee
preferences.' We contend that the theoretical justification for successorship
doctrine is not to be found in a general desire for outcomes which provide a
stable reflection of employee sentiments. Instead, successorship doctrine is
better explained and justified via a rent appropriation analysis.4 In certain
settings employers and employees have incentives to enter into explicit or
implicit contracts under which a part of an employee's compensation is postponed. Obviously, an employer can gain by reneging on such an agreement,
thereby appropriating rents to which the employees have earned a claim.
Incentives to renege greatly increase during a change in ownership. Successorship rules can control these incentives.
In addressing successorship doctrine we depart from the traditional pricefixing cartel model frequently found in the literature' and present a rentdifferentiating between arbitration and NLRB proceedings); Severson & Wilcoxon,
Successorship Under Howard Johnsow Short OrderJustice For Employees, 64 CALIF. L.
REV. 795, 843 (1976) (asserting that the Supreme Court's attempts to refine the
substantial continuity of identity test instead circumscribed the successorship doctrine).
3 Doppelt, supra note 2, at 179-81 (preserving majority status as a key assumption of
successorship doctrine); George, Successorship and the Duty to Bargain, 63 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 277, 297-99 (1988) (basing successorship doctrine on the principle of majority
rule). But see Slicker, A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Employer Successorship-A
Step Toward a RationalApproach, 57 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1054 & n.8 (1973) (suggesting
a similar justification to that expressed here).
An alternative justification is that the doctrine promotes industrial peace. George,
supra, at 299-300 (proposing an industrial peace justification as an alternative to the
employee preference justification); Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligationsof a Successor
Employer, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 735, 743-45 (1969) (stating that the avoidance of industrial
strife by protecting employees from employer's conduct is the basis of successorship
doctrine). Because the industrial peace justification is vague and extremely flexible, it is
difficult to say that it is inconsistent with the justification presented in this Article.
4 Rent represents the excess earned over the opportunity wage. The opportunity wage
is the wage the worker would receive in his most rewarding alternative activity. For
example, if an employee receives ten dollars for each hour of work at his present job, and
would receive five dollars per hour at his highest paying alternative activity, then the rent
earned by the employee equals five dollars. See generally S. FISCHER & R. DORNBUSCH,
ECONOMICS 326-27 (1983) ("An economic rent is the amount of payment to a factor of
production that exceeds the minimum amount that would have to be paid to get that
quantity of the factor supplied to this particular use.").
5 See Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1006-07 (1986)
(defining labor unions as monopolistic entities acting to manipulate wages and
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protecting union model. Using rent appropriation theory, we analyze the
costs and benefits of alternative successorship rules. We conclude that successorship doctrine should be simplified and made slightly more restrictive
by requiring a new employer to honor a predecessor's labor contract whenever a change of ownership occurs through a merger or purchase of stock.'
When change of ownership occurs through an asset sale, then current successorship doctrine should apply with one caveat: the substantial continuity
test's7 requirement that a majority of the new employer's work force be former employees of the predecessor should be relaxed.' Otherwise, a potential
employer who plans to retain only a minority of the predecessor's work force
gains an advantage in a contest for acquisition.9
Those familiar with successorship doctrine will see that we are not proposing major changes. Rather, we suggest an economic justification for much of
existing successorship doctrine. Thus, even though this Article sets out to
describe an optimal successorship policy, it also offers a positive economic
theory of current successorship doctrine.
This Article presents our case for the ideal successorship policy. In our
production); Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1185-86 (1980)
(defining labor unions as monopolistic entities seeking to control the supply of workers,
wages, and working conditions); Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 988, 990 (1984) (discussing the unions' cartelization of labor supply); Winter,
Collective Bargainingand Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union
Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963) (discussing unions as monopolies).
I Under current doctrine, if the purchase is via stock transfer and major structural
changes result, there is no obligation to honor the predecessor's agreement with the
union. See infra notes 53-92 and accompanying text.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 83-85 (defining the substantial continuity test).
s This suggestion may be problematic due to its apparent inconsistency with section
9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988) (providing that a
majority of employees in the bargaining unit can determine whether to join the union).
See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (stating that when a
bargaining unit remained unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new
employer were represented by a certified bargaining agent, the NLRB correctly followed
Section 9(a) by ordering the new employer to bargain with the union); see also Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 664, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(stating that a union representing a majority of the employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit may compel the employer to negotiate with respect to the terms and
conditions of employment applicable to the unit); Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. v.
NLRB, 553 F.2d 609, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that when fewer than a majority of
a successor's employees belonged to a predecessor's union and no anti-union animus was
present, the purchaser was not under a duty to bargain with the union). But see John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 & n.5 (1964) ("The fact that the
Union does not represent a majority of an appropriate bargaining unit . . . does not
prevent it from representing those employees who are covered by the agreement in
dispute .... ").
I See infra text accompanying notes 139-53 (discussing the incentives under current
successorship doctrine).
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view, the goal of successorship doctrine is to frame background rules that
govern compliance with labor contracts when ownership is transferred.
Three different rules are possible: first, a rule that requires the successor
employer to honor the predecessor's labor contract; second, a rule that
imposes no restrictions on the successor employer; and third, a rule that
partially restricts the successor's freedom without requiring the successor to
honor the predecessor's contract. We adopt the first rule and conclude that
a successor employer should honor the predecessor's labor contract because
of informational disparities favoring the predecessor employer and the likelihood that unions will undervalue explicit successorship clauses due to
the uncertainty of their enforceability. Where ownership transfers occur
through asset sales, however, we argue that such a rule should not apply
because it would act as a tax on asset transfers and discourage wealthenhancing asset transfers.'0
Part II of this Article provides a brief summary and background discussion of successorship doctrine. Parts III and IV contain a simple presentation of the rent appropriation problem and its implications for successorship
doctrine. Part V, examines the costs and benefits of alternative successorship rules.
II.

SUCCESSORSHIP DOCTRINE

A. Background and Development
The modern successorship era began with the Supreme Court's decision in
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston," which marked a dramatic departure
from prior successorship cases.' Wiley involved a small publishing company, Interscience Publishers, Inc. ("Interscience"), which merged with
Wiley & Sons, Inc. ("Wiley").' 3 As a result of the merger Interscience
ceased to exist.' 4 Claiming that Wiley was obligated to recognize the rights
10 If an asset is transferred from one use to another-for example, if the owners of a

gas station decide to use part of the station's property as a parking lot-it is reasonable to
infer that the new use is one in which the asset is considerably more valuable. Thus, a tax
which applies to such transfers is likely to have a greater impact the more profitable (or
wealth-enhancing) the transfer.
11 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (holding that the rights of employees under a collective
bargaining agreement are not automatically lost by the disappearance, through merger, of
the employer, and, in appropriate circumstances, the successor employer may be required
to arbitrate under the contract).
12 See generally Goldberg, supra note 3, at 735 (describing the changes in
successorship doctrine brought about by Wiley). Before Wiley, the NLRB and federal
courts had repeatedly held that a labor contract does not survive a change in enterprise
ownership.
13 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 545. Wiley employed some 300 people. About 40 of
Interscience's 80 employees were covered by a collective bargaining agreement which
provided for arbitration.
14 Id.
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of Interscience employees under the existing agreement, the Union brought
suit under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act'15 (the
"LMRA") to compel arbitration.' 6 These rights, the Union argued,
included such things as seniority, pension contributions and severance pay.' 7
Agreeing with the Union that Wiley was obligated to arbitrate regarding
the alleged rights, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement survive a merger because
employees must be protected from sudden changes in the employment relationship resulting from a regime that allows employers the unfettered right
8
to acquire and divest themselves of business enterprises?'
Additionally, the
Court stated that where a "substantial continuity of identity in the business
enterprise" exists, a successor employer will be obligated to arbitrate with
the union according to the terms of the bargaining agreement.' 9
In NLRB v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services, Inc.,' the Supreme
Court appeared to back away from Wiley and the strong presumption favoring arbitration. The dispute in Burns arose when a security contract
between the Wackenhut Corporation ("Wackenhut") and Lockheed Aircraft
Service Company ("Lockheed") expired.' Under the arrangement with
Lockheed, Wackenhut had provided security guards represented by the
recently certified United Plant Guard Union (the "UPG"). 22 Lockheed
solicited bids for a new security contract and eventually awarded it to Burns
International Security Services ("Burns").23 Burns provided Lockheed with
a unit of forty-two guards, twenty-seven of whom were former Wackenhut
employees.' Burns refused a request from the UPG for recognition, recognizing instead the American Federation of Guards which already represented other Burns employees.2
15 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1988).
16 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 545.
17 Id.

Id. at 549.
1 Id. at 550-51. The Court did not provide a test for determining "substantial
continuity of identity," but found continuity in Wiley as a result of the "similarity and
continuity of operation across the change in ownership [which] is adequately evidenced
by the wholesale transfer of Interscience employees to the Wiley plant, apparently
without difficulty." Id.
20 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (stating that while successor employers may be bound to
recognize and bargain with the incumbent union, they are not bound by the substantive
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by their predecessors but not
agreed to or assumed by them).
21 Id. at 274-75.
2 Id. at 274.
23 Id. at 275.
24 Id. at 274.
25 Burns, 406 U.S. at 275-76.
18

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:821

The UPG alleged violations of sections 8(a)(2) 6 and 8(a)(5)- 7 of the
LMRA,as claiming that Bums' recognition of the American Federation of
Guards was unlawful, and that its failure to honor the Wackenhut contract
resulted in an unlawful, unilateral change in employment conditions.' The
National Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB") determined that Bums was
a successor employer and, as such, was obligated to recognize and bargain
with the former Wackenhut employees' union representative.' Relying on
the Wiley decision, the NLRB further required Bums to adopt the substantive terms of the UPG's agreement with Wackenhut."' The Supreme Court
agreed with the NLRB that "where the bargaining unit remains unchanged
and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer are represented
by a recently certified bargaining agent there is little basis for faulting the
[NLRB's] implementation
by ordering the employer to bargain with the
32
incumbent union.",
As far as Bums' duty to bargain with the Union, the Supreme Court held
that the duty arose when Bums hired a majority of holdover Wackenhut
employees.' In other words, Bums was free to establish initial terms and
conditions of hiring. But, when a majority of the new work force came to
consist of "holdover" employees and there was "substantial continuity" in
the business enterprise, Bums became a successor and had to bargain.
Notwithstanding this general rule,' the Court noted that there may be times
when it is "perfectly clear" that the successor employer intends to retain all
of the predecessor's employees, and "it will be appropriate to have him initially consult with the employees' bargaining representative before he fixes
terms."
In an apparent departure from Wiley, the Court concluded that
Bums was under no obligation to assume the substantive terms of the
Wackenhut-UPG contract.3s Specifically, the Court interpreted section
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982) (providing that an employer who "dominate[s] or
interfere[s] with the formation or administration of any labor organization" engages in an
unfair labor practice).
27 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982) (providing that an employer who "refuse[s] to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees" engages in an unfair labor
practice).
28 Burns, 406 U.S. at 276.
26

2 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 285.
32

Id. at 281.

33 Burns, 406 U.S. at 281.
3 Hereinafter, this will be referred to as the "substantial continuity of identity test."
35 Burns, 406 U.S. at 294-95.
36 Id. at 291 ("We accordingly set aside the Board's finding ... as it rested on a
conclusion that Burns was required to but did not honor the collective-bargaining
agreement executed by Wackenhut.").
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8(d) 7 as prohibiting the NLRB from imposing substantive terms on an
employer who was not a party to the contract.as The Court distinguished
Wiley, noting that, unlike Burns, that case involved a suit to compel arbitration under section 301 and that the Court had been particularly concerned
with encouraging arbitration.39
In 1973, the Court once again examined the obligations of a successor
employer, this time in the context of liability for the unfair labor practices of
the predecessor. In Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB,4 ° the successor
employer had purchased a beverage bottling and distribution operation with
the knowledge that the predecessor had been ordered by the NLRB to rehire
and compensate a former employee. 4 The NLRB determined that the successor employer was obligated to rehire the individual and was jointly liable
for the back pay award.' The Supreme Court agreed, noting that industrial
peace and reasonable employee expectations require that a successor with
knowledge of outstanding unfair labor practices be required to remedy
them.43
One year later, the Court effectively overruled Wiley in Howard Johnson
Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, Hotel & RestaurantEmployees.4
Howard Johnson concerned a section 301 action brought by the Hotel and
Restaurant Employees Union to compel arbitration by the new owner, Howard Johnson Co., ("Howard Johnson") under the predecessor's contract. 45
In reversing the Sixth Circuit's order to arbitrate, the Court determined that
there was no substantial continuity of identity in the work force since the
predecessor's employees did not constitute a majority of the new complement of employees, and therefore, Howard Johnson had no duty to arbitrate.46 Furthermore, the Court disavowed the distinction made in Burns
between an unfair labor practice proceeding and a section 301 action. The
37

29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988) (providing that the obligation to bargain "does not

compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession").

'8 Burns, 406 U.S. at 285-87 (distinguishing a duty to bargain from agreement with a
collective-bargaining contract).
19 Id. at 286 ("The present case does not involve a § 301 suit; nor does it involve the
duty to arbitrate.").
40 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
41

Id.

42

Id. at 171.

43 Id. at 184-85 ("To the extent that the employees' legitimate expectation is that the

unfair labor practices will be remedied, a successor's failure to do so may result in labor
unrest .
").
44 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
45 Id. at 252-53.
46 Id. at 263-65. The new employer had hired a total of only 9 former employees out
of the 45 required to operate the business. Id. at 252.
47 Id. at 252, 255-56 (stating that the distinction must not lead to a disregard of the
fundamental policies outlined in Burns).

Since Howard Johnson there has been considerable speculation about the extent to
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Court did, however, suggest that the Union might have moved to enjoin the
predecessor from selling its assets to Howard Johnson on the grounds that
the sale constituted a breach of the successorship clause contained in the

collective bargaining agreement. 48
Notably, the majority pointedly contrasted the merger in Wiley with the
straightforward sale of assets in Howard Johnson.49 In prior successorship
cases the Court had never treated the nature of the underlying corporate
transaction as a relevant consideration. Indeed, in Golden State, the Court
refused "to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the [NLRB] to distinguish
among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets ... so long as there
is a continuity in the employing industry . . . ."5 The emphasis on the
nature of the underlying transaction in HowardJohnson, however, was relatively minor and proved to be short-lived.51 Ultimately, instead of adopting

transaction-specific guidelines for applying the successorship doctrine, the
Court focused on whether the predecessor survived the change in control.52
B.

The Current State of Successorship Doctrine: Fall River Dyeing and
Finishing Corp. v. NLRB

The Court's opinions in Burns and HowardJohnson teach that the NLRB
and federal courts must apply the "substantial continuity of identity" test
when determining a successor's obligation in change of ownership cases.5'
This test, which examines whether there is substantial continuity between
the two business enterprises, is based on the facts and circumstances of each
situation.' The NLRB considers several factors in its successorship analysis

including:
which Wiley must be completely confined to its particular facts. See, e.g., George, supra
note 3, at 277 (summarizing the development of the successorship doctrine and
examining Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987), and its
contribution to successorship principles); Note, The Bargaining Obligationsof Successor
Employers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1975) (examining the uncertainty about what
circumstances warrant imposition of the predecessor's duty to bargain upon a successor
employer and when the obligations attach); Note, The Impact of Howard Johnson on the
Labor Obligationsof the Successor Employer, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 555 (1976) (assessing the
impact of Howard Johnson on the labor law obligations of successor employers).
48 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 258 n.3.
49 Id. at 257 ("Wiley involved a merger .... In contrast, this case involves only a sale
of some assets .... ").
50 Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182-83 n.5 (1973).
51 See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
52 In Wiley the employer ceased to exist because of a merger, while in Howard Johnson
the predecessor survived the sale of assets. Therefore the Court reasoned, because the
Union could have pursued a remedy against the surviving predecessor there was no
obligation to arbitrate. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel
& Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 257-58 (1974).
53 See supra text accompanying notes 20-39, 44-52.
54 Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43 (1987).

1990]

RENT APPROPRIATION

(1) whether there has been a substantial continuity of the same business
operations; (2) whether the new employer uses the same plant;
(3) whether he has the same or substantially the same work force;
(4) whether the same jobs existo under the same working conditions;
(5) whether he employs the same supervisors; (6) whether he uses the
same machinery, equipment, and methods of production; and
(7) whether he manufactures the same produc[t] or offer[s] the same
services.55
The substantial continuity of identity test incorporates the requirement
that there be continuity of the workforce. Thus, to satisfy the test the successor employer must have hired a majority of the predecessor's employees.56 The NLRB has adopted the "substantial and representative
complement rule for fixing the moment when the determination as to the
composition of the successor's work force is to be made."' If at the moment
fixed by the substantial and representative complement rule a majority of the
new employer's workers had been employed by the previous employer "then
I Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. 234, 236 (1972).
The majority requirement can be interpreted in two ways. One method requires the
successor employer to honor the predecessor's labor contract if the successor hires a
majority of the previous employer's employees. The other acknowledges such an
obligation only if the majority of the new employer's workers were employed by the
previous employer. For example, suppose the previous employer had 30 employees and
the new employer has 90 employees, 30 of whom were on the predecessor's payroll.
Under the first method of determining continuity of the workforce, the new employer
would have a duty to bargain. Under the second method, however, the new employer
would not have a duty to bargain.
The second method of determining continuity of the workforce is the approach
accepted by the NLRB in the duty to bargain context. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1972) (articulating the second method of interpretation); see also Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194 (1974) (also articulating the
second method of interpretation), enforced, 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975); Contract
Carrier, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 353, 355 (1981) (finding a successorship obligation when a
new employer hired four of its five employees from the ten employee work force of the
predecessor).
It is unclear whether suits to compel arbitration under section 301 are governed by the
first or second meth'nd of interpretation. See A.B.A., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
359 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1989) ("Cases brought under Section 301 have failed to clarify
or confirm earlier holdings that the Howard Johnson formulation of the majority test
should be applied to determine successorship in Section 301 suits.").
51 Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 47 (1987); see also
NLRB v. Jeffries Lithograph Co., 752 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1985) (suggesting five criteria to
consider under the substantial and representative complement rule:
1) whether job classifications are substantially filled; 2) whether normal production
has resumed; 3) the size of the complement of employees on the normal production
date; 4) the amount of time that will elapse before a larger complement will be at
work; and 5) the relative certainty of the employer's expansion.).
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the successor has an obligation to bargain with the union that represented
these employees."'
The Court applied these doctrines in Fall River Dyeing & Finishing
Corp. v. NLRB. 59 This case concerned the Sterlingwale Corporation
("Sterlingwale"), a textile dyeing and manufacturing plant in Fall River,
Massachusetts. Sterlingwale laid off all of its production employees in February, 1982 after some thirty years in business.6' The company retained a
skeleton crew in order to complete remaining orders and to maintain its
buildings and machinery. 6' For many years, Sterlingwale's employees had
62
been represented by the United Textile Workers of America ("the UTW").

The most recent employment contract expired on April 1, 1982 and embodied several concessions made by the UTW in response to Sterlingwale's
financial problems.63 In the summer of 1982, Sterlingwale went out of business, making an assignment for the benefit of its creditors and hiring a professional liquidator to dispose of its assets." A new company, Fall River
Dyeing & Finishing Corporation ("Fall River"), was formed "with the
intention of engaging strictly in the commission-dyeing business and of taking advantage of the availability of Sterlingwale's assets and workforce." '
In September 1982, Fall River began operating out of its predecessor's
facilities and hiring employees.6 6 On October 19, 1982, the UTW requested
that Fall River recognize it and commence bargaining negotiations.67 Fall
River refused-at this time eighteen of its twenty-one employees were former Sterlingwale employees.68 By January 1983, Fall River had hired fiftyfive employees, a number sufficient to fill one shift. 69 Of these, thirty-six had
worked for Sterlingwale. 7' By April 1983, Fall River was operating with
two full shifts and, for the first time, former Sterlingwale employees were
outnumbered fifty-four to fifty-three.7 '
The UTW filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB alleging
that Fall River had violated sections 8(a)(1) 72 and 8(a)(5) 73 of the LMRA by
58

Fall River, 482 U.S. at 47.

59 Id.
60

Id. at 30-3 1.

61 Id. at 31.
62
63

Id.
Id. at 31-32.

64 Id. at 32.

67

Id.
Id.
Fall River, 482 U.S. at 33.

68

Id.

65
66

Id.
Id.
71 Id.
69

70

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988) (providing that an employer who "interfere[s] with,
restrain[s], or coerce[s] employees in the exercise of... [their guaranteed] rights" engages
72

in an unfair labor practice).
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refusing to bargain. 4 The Administrative Law Judge (the "ALJ") determined that Fall River, as a successor employer, was obliged to bargain with
the UTW if it had hired a majority of Sterlingwale employees. 75 Accordingly, the ALJ found that the Union's demand, originally made in October,
was "of a continuing nature" and was still effective in January when former
Sterlingwale employees
constituted a majority of the "representative
76
complement."
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit enforced the NLRB's order,
noting that "viewed from the employees' standpoint" there was no significant change in business operations.7 7 In addition, the court found that both
the NLRB's "representative complement" rule and "continuing demand"
rule were reasonable and entitled to deference.78
The Supreme Court agreed that Fall River was a successor employer and
that the Burns holding was not limited to situations in which a union had
been recently certified.79 Moreover, the Court stated, a successor "is under
no obligation to hire the employees of its predecessor, subject, of course, to
the restriction that it not discriminate against union employees in its hiring."" 0 This approach places the potential successor in control of his
destiny.8" The Court next examined the three basic rules the NLRB applies
in successorship cases: (1) the "substantial continuity" rule for determining
successorship status; (2) the "representative complement" rule for determining when an analysis of the successor's workforce should take place; and
(3) the "continuing demand" rule preserving a union's demand to bargain
until the "representative complement" is achieved. 2
The "substantial continuity" test compares the nature of the predecessor's
overall enterprise with that of the successor and evaluates each enterprise
73 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988) (providing that an employer who "refuse[s] to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees" engages in an unfair labor
practice).
74 Fall River, 482 U.S. at 34.
75 Id.

Id. (quoting Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 272 N.L.R.B. 839, 840 (1984)).
" Id. at 35 (quoting NLRB v. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 775 F.2d 425, 430
(1st Cir. 1985)).
78 Id. (citation omitted). The "continuing demand" rule allows a union's premature
demand-a demand made prior to the date triggered by the "substantial and
representative complement" rule-to remain in force until the employer acquires a
"substantial and representative complement." Id. at 52; see also supra notes 57-58 and
accompanying text.
79 Fall River, 482 U.S. at 40.
76

80 Id.
1 Id. at 40-41. The Court recognized that "to a substantial extent the applicability of

Burns rests in the hands of the successor. If the new employer makes a conscious
decision to maintain generally the same business and to hire a majority of its employees
from the predecessor, then the bargaining obligation of section 8(a)(5) is activated." Id.
82 Id. at 43; see supra note 78.
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from the employees' point of view.83 "This emphasis on the employees' perspective furthers the Act's policy of industrial peace. If the employees find
themselves in essentially the same jobs after the employer transition and if
their legitimate expectations in continued representation by their union are
thwarted, their dissatisfaction may lead to labor unrest."8 4 Applying the
substantial continuity test, the Court compared the nature of Sterlingwale's
overall enterprise with that of Fall River. Noting that Fall River continued
to manufacture the same product line and that the employees worked at the
same jobs and used the same machinery, the Court agreed that there was
"substantial continuity" between Sterlingwale and Fall River.s
The Court next turned to the "substantial and representative complement" rule. In upholding the NLRB's application of this rule, the Court
noted that the rule was designed to balance the competing interests of maximum employee participation in choosing a bargaining representative and
speedy representation for desirous employees.8 6 Moreover, because the
employer is best situated to determine when normal production has begun
and most job classifications have been filled, the Court concluded that the
"substantial and representative complement" rule is not overly burdensome
87
to employers.
Last, the Court held that the "continuing demand" rule was reasonable
and, given the Union's lack of relationship with the successor, was the only
practical way for the Union to trigger a duty to bargain.as Because unions
frequently will not be aware of the status of the successor's operations, many
demands may be premature. The Court noted, however, that even a premature demand places "a minimal burden" on a successor who knows that the
demand is only effective when a "representative complement" of employees
are hired and the predecessor's employees constitute a majority of the
workforce.8 ' The possibility raised in Howard Johnson, of analyzing successorship cases based on the nature of the underlying corporate transaction,
90
did not affect the analysis in Fall River.

84

Id.; see supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43-44.

85

Id. at 45. The strongest argument against a finding of substantial continuity was the

83

seven month hiatus before Fall River began operations. The Court did not recognize this

fact as "determinative" and concluded that it was "only one factor in the

... calculus

and . . . relevant only when there are other indicia of discontinuity." Id. at 45. Thus,

absent other indications of discontinuity, a hiatus in operations will not serve to defeat a
claim of successorship.
86

Id. at 46-48. In applying the substantial and representative complement rule the

Board generally looks to see whether the relevant job classifications are full, or
substantially full, and whether the enterprise is at, or close to, normal production.
81 Fall River, 482 U.S. at 46-48.
88

Id. at 52.

89

Id.

9o See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel & Restaurant

Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974); see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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Justice Powell, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, dissented in
Fall River. Justice Powell focused on the "overwhelming" evidence of discontinuity including the long hiatus in operations and Fall River's refusal to
purchase Sterlingwale's tradename, goodwill, or customer lists.9 ' Thus, the
dissent suggests that where there is a lengthy interruption in production or
other indicia of discontinuity this evidence should bar assertion of successor
obligations.92
Both the Fall River majority and dissent suggest that the application of
the substantial continuity test is likely to be affected by competing functional
considerations regarding the social desirability of allowing unfettered freedom to acquire and transfer businesses and the protection of employee
expectations. In the remainder of this Article we explore the balance of conflicting interests and examine the theoretical basis for a successorship rule.
III.
A.

RENT

PROTECTION AND THE UNION

A Model of the Rent Protecting Union

We present a model of the union that differs in important respects from
the more traditional monopoly union model. The traditional model treats
the union as a price-fixing cartel, that is, a combination of workers that uses
its monopoly power to push wages above the competitive level. 93 We provide the alternative model of a rent-protecting union, whose primary function is to protect the rent earned by employees from employer efforts to
expropriate it through wage reductions.
The function of the rent-protecting union is different from that of the
monopoly union. In labor markets, implicit agreements often emerge under
which workers are paid, for a period of time, more than their opportunity
wages. Such an agreement might be observed in settings in which workers
have invested a great deal in firm-specific training." Alternatively, this
9' Fall River, 482 U.S. at 57 (Powell, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 59 ("I would hold that the successorship doctrine has no application when the

break in continuity between enterprises is as complete and extensive as it was here.").
13 See Simons, Some Reflections on Syndicalism, 52 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1944)
(constructing a traditional monopoly critique of unionism). A well known alternative to
the monopoly model views the union as a provider or protector of certain work place
public goods such as safety. See Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57
Pun. INTEREST 69 (1974) (challenging the view that unions are organizations whose chief
function is to raise wages and asserting that unions have significant nonwage effects
which influence diverse aspects of modern industrial life); Hylton & Hylton, Rational
Decisions and Regulation of Union Entry, 34 VILL. L. REV. 145 (1989) (identifying
monopoly resource misallocation as the key source of social cost and the enhanced
provision of work place public goods as the major source of social benefits).
94 This point, and most others concerning the economics of human capital, was
originally made by Gary Becker. See G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (2d ed. 1975). The
human capital literature distinguishes firm-specific training, which in the extreme case

raises the worker's productivity only within his employer's firm, from general training,
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might be observed in settings where loyalty or fidelity to the employer is an
important characteristic, and where the employee risks losing the excess
over the opportunity wage by shirking or acting in some way counter to the
wishes of the employer."5 In such settings the employee may have "earned"
a claim to a stream of rents by sacrificing earnings elsewhere to participate in
specialized training, or merely by sacrificing opportunities to satisfy his
desires in order to carry out the employer's program.' The employer may,
under certain conditions, however, have an incentive to renege on the
implicit promise to provide a stream of rents as compensation for earlier
sacrifices by the employees. It is to prevent this kind of opportunism that
the union exists under the rent-protecting model. 97
We do not assert that the rent-protecting model is the correct or most
appropriate description of the union. Rather, we emphasize this alternative
which raises the worker's productivity by the same amount in all firms that could employ
the worker. See Wachter & Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: An
Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and
Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1362-64 (1988) (presenting a clear discussion of the

relationship between wages and marginal product in a model of firm-specific training).
o See Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of
Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974) (arguing that where detection is uncertain, corrupt
law enforcement can be discouraged by raising the salaries of enforcers above what they
could get elsewhere by an amount inversely related to the probability of detection and
directly related to the size of bribes and other benefits from malfeasance); Lazear, Agency,
Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 606 (1981)
(arguing that it is optimal to construct age-earnings profiles which pay workers less than
the value of marginal products ("VMP") when they are young and more than the VMP
when they are old); Lazear, Why is There Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1261
(1979) (exploring explanations for termination of older employees rather than reduction
in wages commensurate with marginal output).
91 See G. BECKER, supra note 94, at 26-37.
9' See Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 315-16 (1978) (suggesting that the
existence of a union not only makes it more costly for a firm to cheat an individual
worker in his last pay period due to strike threat, but that the union's existence also
makes it more costly for an individual worker to cheat the firm because the union has the
incentive to prevent such an externality on the continuing workers); Williamson,
Wachter, & Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of
Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. EON. & MGMT. ScI. 250, 269-70 (1975) (arguing that
opportunistic bargaining not only absorbs resources, but delays and possibly forgoes
efficient adaptations within the internal labor market system); see also Alchian, Decision

Sharing and Expropriable Specific Quasi-Rents: A Theory of First National Maintenance
Corporation v. NLRB, 1 Sup. Cr. EcON. REV. 235, 243-44, (1982) ("[o]ne function of
labor unions is to act as agents for employees in labor contract monitoring, dispute, and
negotiations"); Lande & Zerbe, Reducing Unions' Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits, 28
J.L. & ECON. 297, 300 (1985) (arguing that unions may enhance the credibility of
workers and ensure performance of long term contracts while also providing a credible
threat against companies that attempt opportunistic behavior).
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to the monopoly model because it has not been discussed or rigorously
applied previously and, more importantly, because it provides a strong foundation for arguments that seek to limit the discretion of successor employers
by taking into consideration the "legitimate expectations" of employees.98
Our model of the Rent-Protecting Union is illustrated by the following
example. Assume Apple Corporation ("Apple") grows and sells apples.
The employees of Apple are members of the Union of Apple Pickers (the
"UAP"). The wages received by the union members total $5,500 per day. If
the members of the UAP were to leave Apple and take the next best available work, they would receive a total of $1,000 per day. Apple's revenue is

$8,500 per day.
Apple has invested a great deal in employee training. The total training

cost, amortized, is $4,000 per day. Moreover, because Apple is the only
corporation which uses the methods taught to its workers, the training is
"firm-specific."
Thus, following the human capital literature, 1"0 we will
assume that the training cost is shared between the employer and the
employees, with Apple's share of the amortized training cost equal to $1,000
11
per day, and UAP's share equal to $3,000 per day.
The "appropriable rent" earned by the union is $4,500 ($5,500 $1,000).102 This is appropriable by the employer because the employer can
lower the amount paid to the union to any level greater than $1,000 and still
retain the workers. Similarly, the appropriable rent earned by the employer
is $3,000 ($8,500 - $5,500), because the union can raise its total take to any
amount less than $8,500 and still retain the work.
98 Court opinions in this area often phrase the general problem of determining an ideal
successorship rule in the form of a balancing test. See, e.g., Golden State Bottling Co. v.
NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973) (construing the Board's order to reinstate an employee
with back pay as an "equitable balance"); NLRB v. Jeffries Lithograph Co., 752 F.2d
459, 463 (9th Cir. 1985) ("If the Board and the courts failed to bind a successor to the
labor law obligations of the predecessor, then the successor could deprive employees of
the benefits they previously had won through collective action-a move that might
disrupt industrial peace by disappointing workers' legitimate expectations ...
.
99 See G. BECKER, supra note 94, at 26-37 (defining firm-specific training).
1o Id. (stating that, in the context of firm-specific training, firms do not pay all
training costs or collect all returns, but instead share both with employees).
101 Under these assumptions the union's "economic profit" is $1,500 per day ($5,500
- $1,000 - $3,000). The employer's economic profit is $2,000 per day ($8,500 $5,500 - $1,000). Economic profit is defined generally as the difference between revenue
and the opportunity cost of resources used. See R. LIPSEY, P. STEINER, & D. PURVIS,
ECONOMICS 168 (8th ed. 1987). However, it is easier to understand economic profit as
the amount above the minimum required to supply any service.
102 See Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, .supra note 97, at 298 (defining the term
"appropriable quasi-rent" and distinguishing quasi-rent from economic rent); see also
supra note 4. For the sake of simplicity and clarity we will substitute economic profit for
economic rent and rent for quasi-rent.
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Opportunism and the Role of the Union

The role of the union in the above illustration is to protect the wages of
the employees from opportunistic, competitive wage cutting by the
employer. Because the employees earn a substantial appropriable rent the
employer has an incentive to recoup part of that rent by reducing wages. If
the employees were not unionized the employer's task might be facilitated.
For example, the employer could inform each worker that demand conditions have recently worsened, and that only those employees who accept
wage cuts will be retained. Because employees usually rely on their
employer's assessment of demand conditions,' this statement might be sufficient to engage employees in a round of competitive wage cutting. The
employer then has a further incentive to try this maneuver repeatedly until
wages are driven as low as possible. A union can prevent such wage reduction by requiring the employer to keep wages fixed and instead reduce total
hours in response to a downturn in demandl °4 In addition, the union could
seek to increase employees' wages by appropriating the rent earned by the
employer. For example, if the union strikes at apple-picking time the
employer might be forced to accept wage demands since there is little time to
find substitute employees.
The story of the employment relationship presented here depicts the phenomenon of equalizing bargaining power.' 05 Unions equalize bargaining
power by overcoming the incentive structure under which each employee is
compelled to undercut fellow employees and by changing the setting from
one in which only the employer can appropriate rent to one in which both
parties, employer and union, have this power.
IV. A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF SUCCESSORSHIP RULES
The Supreme Court has referred to the "free transfer of capital" as a factor to be considered in shaping successorship doctrine."o Although this
103 See Hart, Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An
Introduction, 50 REV. ECON. STUD. 3 (1983) (emphasizing the fundamental
informational asymmetry between employer and employee). According to the literature,
unemployment results from an optimal, implicit contract between the employer and

employee that arises in a situation in which only the employer knows the state of demand
for the firm's product. The optimal contract requires the employer to lay off the
employee during a downturn, thus providing a disincentive to the employer to report
false demand declines in return for reduced wages.
101 See, e.g., Wachter & Cohen, supra note 94, at 1355 (making a similar hours for
wages argument).
105 The claim that unions equalize bargaining power has been an important

justification for labor organization. See, e.g., American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent.
Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204 (1921) (interpreting the Clayton Act to allow a union
to encourage a peaceful strike against an employer).
1o Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel & Restaurant
Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 255 (1974).
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concept has not been carefully articulated, the Court's opinions reflect a concern that a restriction on the successor employer's freedom to hire might
impede the transfer of assets to higher-valuing users and ultimately work
against the employee's interests."° For example, a doctrine which placed
severe restrictions on successor employers might reduce the incentives entrepreneurs have to take over failing businesses.' 0 8
This concern appears inconsistent with the Coase theorem.'O' As long as
the rule governing the successor employer is unambiguous, successorship
doctrine should have no effect on the mobility of capital. A rule giving the
successor employer complete freedom in hiring results in corporate transfers
occurring at one price level, while a rule denying freedom to the successor
leads to transfers occurring at another, presumably lower, price level." 0
Furthermore, the efficient successorship rule would be observed because the
parties to a corporate transfer could always contract around an inefficient
successorship rule."' Therefore, capital would be equally mobile whether
the regime denies the successor employer complete freedom with respect to
hiring decisions or gives the successor an unfettered right to choose his or
her employees.
Since transaction costs and informational disparities are endemic to realworld markets, we will not end our analysis of the successorship problem
with a statement of the Coase theorem. Instead, we present a more careful
analysis of the underlying economic issues in the remainder of this Part.
This analysis focuses on the issues raised by the rent-protecting model of
unions discussed in the previous Part. 11 2 We note that this model of the
union, and of firms generally, is restrictive in that it excludes the role of non-

human capital in production. Nevertheless, its simplicity allows us to pres1O See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972).
108 See, e.g.,
id. ("A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund
business only if he can make changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor
force, work location, task assignment, and nature of supervision.").
109 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (arguing that in the
absence of transactions costs, parties to a contract will bargain between themselves and
reach an efficient arrangement irrespective of the assignment of legal rights).
110 For example, suppose provisions in the existing union contract lower the value of
the firm from $25 million to $20 million. Then a successor employer who is free to ignore
the provisions would be willing to pay $25 million for the firm, and one who is not would
be willing to pay no more than $20 million.
M' For example, assume that inefficient provisions in the existing union contract lower
the firm's value by $5 million. Assume further, that the union would allow the successor
to alter these provisions in exchange for a $2 million total increase in wages. Because the
provisions lower the firm's value by an amount that exceeds their value to the union, they
are inefficient. Accordingly, the firm's value could be increased by $3 million if the
successor transferred $2 million to the workers in exchange for the elimination of the
inefficient union contract provisions. In this example, an inefficient successorship rule
would require the successor employer to honor the existing contract provisions.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
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ent some of the economic issues more clearly. In Part V, we extend the
discussion in several ways, including a consideration of the implications of
successorship law for the transferability of capital assets.
A.

Incentives Under Alternative Successorship Rules
We now return to the example of the Apple Pickers Union'1 3 to examine
the incentives under alternative successorship rules. To analyze these incentives, one must ask two questions: (1) how much will an interested entrepreneur offer for Apple Corporation and, (2) who, if anyone, gains or loses from
the sale? The answers depend on whether the buyer has to honor the UAP's
contract. Before examining these questions under current successorship
doctrine, we first consider the answers that emerge under the two extreme
successorship rules." 4

1. Requiring the Successor Employer to Honor the Predecessor's
Contract
If a successorship rule requires the successor employer to honor the terms
of the predecessor's labor contract, the maximum price a prospective successor will offer for Apple will not exceed the present value of an income stream
providing $3,000 each day." 5 If the market for ownership is competitive,
the buyer will be forced to pay this maximum price."' This answer is complicated by the prospect of a future union strike. Thus, a successor employer
also will be concerned about the union's reputation. If the union cannot be
trusted, the maximum price a successor will
offer for Apple will fall to reflect
7
the estimated losses from future strikes."1
On the other hand, under a rule requiring the successor employer to
11S See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
114 At one extreme the successor employer must honor the union's contract with the
predecessor employer; at the other extreme, the successor has no such obligation.
"I Recall that Apple's revenue is $8,500 per day and the union payroll is $5,500 per
day. See supra text accompanying note 99. More precisely, the price will not exceed the
present value of an income stream providing $3,000 each day for the life of the firm. See
generally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 10-12 (2d ed.
1984) (providing an introductory discussion of present value). For example, let us
assume the firm generates income 250 days each year and that the interest rate is 10%.
The maximum price offered for Apple Corporation would be $7.5 million
(250 X $3,000 / .1) if the firm was expected to exist in perpetuity. Id. at 30-31
(discussing the concept of perpetuities and providing present value formulas for
calculating a stream of payments in perpetuity).
11 If the buyer's bid is less than the firm's value then another potential buyer could
offer a slightly higher bid and still profit from acquiring the firm.
117 For example, suppose that there is a 50% probability that the union will strike 100
days each year. If the interest rate is 10%, the loss due to strikes would equal $1.5
million (.5 X 100 X $3,000 / .1). Therefore, the maximum price offered for the
corporation drops from $7.5 million to $6 million. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra
note 115, at 30-31.
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honor the preexisting union contract, the union would have an incentive to
try to appropriate the employer's rent. For example, the union might strike
for higher wages as soon as it learned that the predecessor was planning to
sell the enterprise." 8 Any union concerns about estranging the predecessor

employer would be tempered by the knowledge of the predecessor's imminent departure. This incentive, however, would be offset by two countervailing interests: first, the predecessor employer's interest in receiving the
capitalized value of any bargained-for rent under the contract; and second,
the union's interest in preserving its reputation which would be tarnished by

an opportunistic strike. 119

Another circumstance in which the union has the incentive to attempt
rent appropriation arises if the successor employer tries to change the production process. 2 ' Because the union's contract with the predecessor
employer binds the successor, the incoming ownership would have to pay
the union for the right to make changes to the existing contract. 121 The
union could use this as an opportunity to transfer part of the employer's rent
to itself.
2.

Not Requiring the Successor Employer to Honor the Predecessor's
Contract

We now consider the case where the successor is under no obligation to
honor the predecessor's union contract 22 Because efficient contracts differ
analytically from inefficient contracts, we discuss these two possibilities

separately.
118 Unions have an incentive to resist any wage reductions sought by the successor,
especially where the successor is forced to face several unions. In this situation, each
union has an incentive to hold out and let the other unions bear the costs of concession.
This incentive to resist wage reductions is further exacerbated by a successorship rule
requiring the new employer to honor the predecessor's contract.
119 But see Benson, Union Democracy and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 11 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 153 (1982-83) (describing how union leadership is often so
entrenched with pursuing its own goals that it is unresponsive to the wishes of its
membership and fails to pay attention to the union's reputation); Klein, Crawford, &
Alchian, supra note 97, at 314-15 n.34 (arguing that union leaders have little incentive to
protect the union's reputation unless markets exist in which union leadership can be
bought or sold).
120 For example, a change in the production process would include situations in which
the successor employer changes work assignments.
121 Efficient alterations in the contract could benefit both parties. However, because of
strategic behavior, the parties might never reach an efficient agreement. See generally A.
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 18-20 (2d ed. 1989)
(discussing the problems presented by strategic behavior).
122 We assume that the union and the predecessor employer have not signed an
agreement requiring the predecessor to transfer the enterprise only to a successor who
will honor the union's contract.
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(a) Efficient Union Contracts. Under a rule where the successor
employer is not bound by the terms of the union's contract with the previous
employer, the potential for rent appropriation provides an incentive to abandon even an efficient union contract. For instance, in our example, by lowering union wages to $1,000 the successor employer can enjoy an extra $4,500
from the Apple acquisition.' Thus, the successor will offer a price that will
not exceed the capitalized value of an income stream promising $7,500 each
day.'
Each sale would provide a $4,500 per day windfall to be split
between the successor and predecessor employers.l' s Because of the potential windfalls resulting from appropriating union rents (holding everything
else constant), this rule will generate more frequent transfers than26 a rule
binding the successor to the predecessor's contract with the union.
It might be argued that the potential for rent appropriation will not necessarily provide an additional incentive to transfer an enterprise because the
successor will be concerned about damaging its reputation. If rent is appropriated during a transfer, however, it is unlikely that the successor's reputation will be harmed even if the appropriation is motivated solely by greed.'17
The transfer of an enterprise is sometimes spurred by unfavorable events
that justify concessions from all parties; it is difficult to distinguish rentappropriating demands from those required to keep the enterprise afloat.
Furthermore, in a competitive acquisition market the predecessor is most
likely to benefit from any potential rent appropriation. And, because the
predecessor is ending the union relationship, it will be relatively unconcerned about a potential loss in reputational capital.
Nevertheless, even if the predecessor employer is less likely to be concerned about reputation, the fear of future liability, 128 or a lingering sense of
123 Recall that we assumed that the union's wages are $5,500 per day. See supra text
accompanying note 99. Thus, by lowering the wages to $1,000 per day, the successor
employer gains $4,500 per day.
124 This figure represents Apple's revenue of $8,500 per day less the reduced union
payroll of $1,000 per day. See supra note 115 (describing a present value or capitalization
calculation method). If the firm operates 250 days each year and the annual interest rate
is 10%, the present value equals $18.75 million (250 X $7,500 / .1).
125 The new daily income stream of $7,500 per day less the original maximum offering
price of $3,000 per day equals $4,500. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
126 Note, however, that in a competitive acquisition market, the windfall from rent
appropriation will generally accrue to the predecessor employer. This is because the
potential successor employers will attempt to outbid each other for the assets of the
predecessor employer. As a result, the rent appropriation surplus will be reflected in the
price paid for the successor employer's assets.
121 See Shleifer & Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 41-42 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988) (arguing that
hostile takeovers are a means of redistributing the ex post rents of employment contracts
from employees to owners without violating the loyalty and trust of the incumbent
employees).
128 See J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC PROCESSES,
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obligation to its former employees,' may compel the outgoing ownership to
resist a transfer that is likely to result in rent appropriation. Despite the
apparent validity of this argument, it is impossible to say how prevalent such
a sense of obligation or fear of liability is among firm management. Moreover, in the face of predecessor resistance a transfer can be effected through a
tender offer. Indeed, several commentators have argued that rent appropriation is an important cause of much of the takeover activity observed
todayJ30

(b) Inefficient Union Contracts. An alternative approach that favors an
unrestrictive successorship doctrine assumes that there are inefficient features in the contract between the union and the predecessor employer. For
example, the contract might include staffing requirements which add to production costs without increasing output or enhancing efficiency.' 3 ' Suppose

that these inefficient features reduce the value of the enterprise by $500 per
day. If the successor employer has the right to ignore such provisions the
firm's transfer value is increased, and, upon transfer, the potential appropriation surplus of $4,50032 is increased by this $500 efficiency surplus. Thus,
the maximum price the successor will offer equals the capitalized value 1of an
income stream promising $8,000 per day ($3,000 + $4,500 + $500). 33

(stating that the most effective way to insure against
future liability is to have the purchaser assume the contract). But see id. at 174 ("this
conclusion does not necessarily apply where the original agreement contains stronger
language providing for continuity"); Estreicher, Successorship Obligations, in LABOR
LAW AND PRACTICE 175 (1988)

LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE 63, 69 (S. Estreicher & D. Collins eds. 1988) (stating that

the adoption of a very explicit successorship clause may force the successor to honor the
predecessor's agreement with the union).
1'9 See R.

FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE

EMOTIONS (1988); Akerlof, Loyalty Filters, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 54 (1983) (arguing that
acting out of a sense of obligation may be consistent with rational, self-interested
behavior).
130 See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 127, at 41-42. Rent may be appropriated from
other sources in a takeover. Suppliers who enter into long term contracts that require
substantial, transaction-specific investments make up one source, and bondholders, who
often see the value of their claims fall after a takeover, provide a second source of rent
transfer.

See J. ROSETT, Do UNION WEALTH CONCESSIONS EXPLAIN TAKEOVER

(National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 3187, 1989) (concluding that the rent transfer hypothesis is
not a significant explanation of takeover premiums). Even if the average takeover
premium does not represent a transfer from employees, however, the question remains
whether labor law should attempt to control the successor's efforts to transfer this rent.
131 It is necessary to assume a certain lack of competition in the product market if a
firm with inefficient contractual arrangements is to survive because inefficient firms in
competitive industries are driven out in the long run. See generally R. LIPSEY, P.
STEINER, & D. PURVIS, supra note 101, at 223 (stating that inefficient firms may exist
because the market is uncompetitive due to entry barriers).
132 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
113 Recall that Apple's net revenue is $3,000, the potential appropriable rent surplus is
PREMIUMS? THE EVIDENCE ON CONTRACT WAGES
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In a competitive acquisition market, the benefits arising from the elimination of inefficient provisions, and the costs resulting from the failure to eliminate such provisions, will fall on the predecessor. Thus, if the predecessor
employer pays for such provisions by reducing the value of the firm, one
might reasonably ask how inefficient provisions could ever appear. The literature 34 has already provided the answer-the firm's owners and managers
may have different interests.lm5 Moreover, the firm's owners cannot
costlessly monitor all of management's actions nor achieve perfect incentive
alignment through piece rate schemes or backloading compensation." 4
Thus, in the course of bargaining with union representatives, management
may compromise shareholder interests in order to gain contractual provisions which suit its tastes.
These observations justify allowing a successor to ignore completely the
provisions of a predecessor's contract because the elimination of inefficient
provisions generates surplus value, which in turn enhances the chance of
buyers purchasing firms that would otherwise remain unsold. Therefore, an
unrestrictive successorship rule provides two distinct benefits: first, it indirectly controls agency costs by generating incentives to transfer corporations
in order to eliminate inefficient contractual provisions; and second, it allows
for the elimination of inefficient contract terms when such terms threaten the
firm and its employees. These benefits, however, should be weighed against
the costs generated by the potential for rent appropriation.
$4,500, and the efficiency surplus is $500. See supra notes 99, 102, 123 and
accompanying text. Assume, as in the previous examples, that the firm operates 250 days
each year and the annual rate of interest is 10%. Then the present or capitalized value of
such a stream is $20 million. See supra note 115.
134 See 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR (1964)
(postulating that managers direct firm resources to increase their own utility); Alchian,
The Basis of Some Recent Advances in the Theory of Management of the Firm, 14 J.
INDUS. ECON. 30 (1965) (reviewing several theories of firm management); Jensen &
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. EON. 305 (1976) (providing a formal analysis of the agency costs and
who bears them); see also W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH
(1958) (proposing that managers sacrifice profits in order to maximize sales); G. BECKER,
THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1971) (explaining that managers sacrifice profits
in order to satisfy a "taste" for discrimination); R. MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF
MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM (1964) (explaining that managers sacrifice profits in order to
maximize growth).
135 For example, the managers may prefer expensive nonmonetary benefits such as
thick rugs or executive washrooms, or they may desire to associate only with workers of a
given race. See G. BECKER, supra note 134, at 67. The shareholders might also feel the
same way if they were working within the firm, but in most cases they are concerned only
with the value of their shares.
136 Monitoring, backloading wages, and privatization through adoption of a piece rate
scheme follow the three general approaches to controlling agency costs. See Becker &
Stigler, supra note 95, at 1 (examining the enforcement of legal systems).
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Because the successor employer can always condition the purchase of an
enterprise on the elimination of inefficient contractual provisions, there is
some concern about the desirability of an unrestricted successorship rule."a
Because inefficient provisions reduce a firm's value, the successor employer
should be willing to "buy-out" the union's inefficient provisions, in a transaction that generates wealth for all parties. This suggests that under a successorship rule which requires the successor to honor the terms of the
predecessor's contract, the mere existence of inefficient contractual provisions does not necessarily mean that a successor employer will refuse to
purchase an enterprise. The only costs resulting under such a rule are those
the successor incurs in bargaining for the elimination of inefficient contractual provisions. These transaction costs include the cost of identifying inefficient contractual provisions and the cost of getting the union to make
concessions with respect to inefficient provisions. Only the latter costs are
relevant, however, because the costs of identification would most likely be
incurred by the successor employer under any successorship rule.1"
3. Summary
Thus far, we have considered the two extremes along a continuum of
potential successorship rules: a restrictive rule that requires the successor to
honor the predecessor's union contract; and an unrestrictive rule that permits the successor to ignore such a contract, as well as any other union obligations. A restrictive successorship rule encourages the union to attempt
appropriation of the predecessor employer's surplus. This incentive, however, is offset by the union's interest in protecting its reputational capital,
and by the predecessor employer's interest in obtaining its bargained-for rent
under the initial contract.
An unrestrictive successorship rule generates incentives for both the successor and predecessor to appropriate the union's rent, and thereby deny
employees anticipated compensation for firm-specific training, or for forgoing opportunities to shirk at the predecessor employer's expense. Because
these rent appropriating transfers discourage various investments (such as
firm-specific training), an unrestrictive successorship rule increases transfer
incentives and concomitantly generates social costs. Arguably, an unrestrictive successorship rule generates social benefits by encouraging corporate
transfers that eliminate inefficient contractual provisions, thereby controlling
137

Dicker, Sale of Assets, Mergers, and Acquisitions: A Management View, in
LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE 169, 171 (S. Estreicher & D. Collins eds. 1988)

See

LABOR

(suggesting that a purchaser may condition the sale upon obtaining a new collectivebargaining agreement); Doppelt, supra note 2, at 185 ("[A]n employer could deprive
employees of valuable contractual gains, including wages, benefits, and job security
accumulated only after long struggles.").
138 This is not to say that these costs are trivial. See supra notes 118 & 121 and
accompanying text (describing strategic union behavior).

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:821

agency costs. This benefit, however, may also be realized, although to a
lesser extent, under a restrictive successorship rule.
B. Incentives Under Current Successorship Doctrine
Current successorship doctrine instructs the NLRB to apply the substantial continuity test to determine successorship status. 3 9 The key question
under this test is whether a majority of the successor's employees were
employed by the predecessor."4 To facilitate our examination of the incentive effects of the substantial continuity test, we will assume that the courts
will generally find successor status when a majority of the new employees are
former employees of the predecessor.
We now return to the Apple Corporation example.' 4 ' Assume that the
successor employer plans to operate the same business and hire the same
number of employees. If the purchasing employer hires all of Apple's
employees it becomes a successor under the substantial continuity test, and
therefore, has a duty to bargain with the UAP if it wishes to make any
changes to the union's contract with the predecessor." Thus, the successor
employer may not be able to appropriate all of the union's rent. The amount
of rent that the successor will be able to appropriate will depend upon the
outcome of the bargaining process. Accordingly, the successor's offering
price will equal the capitalized value of an income stream paying $3,000 per
day-the price it would pay if it had to honor the predecessor's contract
with the union-plus the value of the union's rent multiplied 43by the
probability that the successor will be able to appropriate this rent.
Conversely, if the successor hires fewer than half of Apple's employees,
under the simplified substantial continuity test it will not have to bargain
with the union, and it can thus appropriate the rent of the remaining
19

See supra text accompanying notes 53-57 and notes 82-85.

See Dicker, supra note 137, at 172-73 (stating that the most significant factor is
whether a majority of the new employer's bargaining unit employees were members of the
predecessor's unit); Estreicher, supra note 128, at 72 ("a majority of the purchaser's
employees must come from the ranks of the predecessor's workforce"); George, supra
note 3, at 279 (stating that work force continuity generally determines successorship
status); see also Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 47 (1987)
("If... a majority of the successor's employees had been employed by its predecessor,
then the successor has an obligation to bargain .....
141 See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
142 See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27,43 (1987) (setting
140

forth the rules under the substantial continuity test); see also text accompanying notes 82-

84.

143 For example, suppose the rent earned by the union is $1,000 per day. Then if the
interest rate is 10%, and the firm operates 250 days each year, the present value of the
stream of rents (in perpetuity) is (250 X $1,000/ .1) = $2.5 million.

If the probability that the union's rent can be appropriated is .5, the maximum price an
acquiring employer would be willing to offer is $7.5 million (the present value of $3,000
per day) plus $1.25 million (.5 X the present value of $1,000 per day).
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employees."' The successor employer who takes this action, however, will
lose the value of the unhired majority's experience while gaining the rent
appropriated from the retained minority. This is an undesirable trade-off if
the employees are equally productive. For example, assume that Apple Corporation employs 100 workers, each with a post-training marginal product
equal to sixty-five dollars per day. Recall that the pretraining marginal
product-as reflected by the amount the employees would gross if they were
to leave Apple for another firm-is ten dollars.' 45 If the successor retains
only thirty employees the maximum gain is $1,350 and the minimum loss is
$3,850.'6 Thus, the potential successor will offer less than the $3,000 per
day price that would be offered by an employer bound by the original contract. 147 Therefore, an employer who plans to hire less than half of Apple's
former employees is likely to lose a bidding contest to an employer planning
to hire all of the employees and operate under the existing agreement.
If the employees of Apple are not equally productive, however, the substantial continuity test creates profit opportunities for the successor. For
example, assuming that the new employer retains forty employees who each
contribute $110 per day and refuses to hire the remaining sixty, who each

contribute thirty-five dollars per day, 48 then the appropriable rent is
$1,800 49 The minimum loss from forfeiting the experience of the remaining
sixty, however, is $1,500."
In this case, it is possible for the successor to
gain from retaining only a minority of the predecessor's employees and
appropriating the rent earned by that minority. The potential successor,
therefore, might offer a buying price that is greater than that offered by an
employer who plans to hire 100% of the predecessor's employees.
144 Note that the successor will be held in violation of the section 8(a)(3) prohibition
against discrimination of union members if the predecessor's employees prove that the
successor refused to hire them solely to avoid recognizing the union. Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941). We assume, however, that the successor can find a
way of hiring a minority of the predecessor's employees without revealing a
discriminatory intent.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 98-100 (stating that if the members of the UAP
were to leave Apple they would collectively receive $1,000-$10 for each of the 100
employees).
146 Recall that the appropriable rent is $4,500 per day. See supra note 123 and
accompanying text. If there are 100 employees then the appropriable rent per employee
is $45. Thus, the maximum gain from retaining 30 employees equals $1,350 (30
employees X $45 appropriated rent per employee). The minimum loss equals $3,850 (70
employees X ($65 - $10)), where $65 - $10 is the net loss in marginal product
experienced by substituting an untrained worker for a trained one. Note that this is a
minimum because the employer may have to train the new employees as well.
147 See supra text accompanying note 115.
148 Note that this averages to $65 per day for the 100 union members.
149 This figure represents 40 X $45 of appropriable rent per employee. See supra note
146.
150 The net productivity loss, $35 - $10, multiplied by 60 equals $1,500.
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For example, suppose that the successor is able to appropriate all of the
rent going to the forty high-productivity employees and suffers no more than
the loss of forfeiting the experience of the sixty low-productivity employees.
Then the successor will offer, at most, a price equal to the capitalized value
of $3,300 per day ($3,000 - $1,500 + $1,800).1 On the other hand, if q
represents the probability that the employer who hires all of the predeces152
sor's employees will be able to appropriate the rent of those employees,
that employer will offer a price equal to the capitalized value of $3,000 +
q($4,500) per day."5 If q is less than or equal to seven percent, this amount
would be less than the capitalized value of $3,300 per day. The employer
who plans to retain only forty of Apple's 100 employees, therefore, would
most likely win out in a bidding contest for Apple corporation.
As this example demonstrates, the substantial continuity test has rather
predictable effects on the incentives of potential successor employers. To the
extent that the successorship test can be reduced to a set of comprehensible
rules, the potential successor can decide whether or not it should attempt to
meet or avoid the requirements for successorship status. If the predecessor's
employees are sufficiently alike with respect to productivity, the potential
employer probably will not gain by setting out to evade a determination of
successorship status. In such a case, anything the successor gains from
appropriating the rent of the minority, it will probably lose from forfeiting
the experience of the unhired majority.
If there is considerable variance in the marginal products of the predecessor's employees, however, the substantial continuity test provides a subsidy
to the employer who is best able to avoid a finding of successorship status
and appropriate the rent of a highly productive minority. If the subsidy is
large enough, the potential successor who plans to retain only a minority of
the predecessor's employees may be able to outbid profitably another potential successor who plans to retain all of the predecessor's employees and to
avoid an obligation to honor the predecessor's contract with the union.
V.

TOWARD AN IDEAL SUCCESSORSHIP RULE

The foregoing illustrates that current successorship doctrine is flawed.
Under certain conditions, it provides an advantage in an acquisition contest
to the potential acquiror who plans to retain only a minority of the predecessor employer's workforce. Whether one's interest is primarily in policing
151 In this example, $3,000 equals the original offering price, $1,500 equals the loss
from forfeiting the discharged employees experience, and $1,800 equals the rent

appropriated from the retained employees. See supra text accompanying notes 115 and
149.
152 Recall that an employer who hires all of the predecessor's employees will have both
a duty to recognize the existing contract with the employees' union or a duty to bargain
for modifications.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 115, 123 (defining the maximum offering price
as $3,000 per day and the appropriable rent as $4,500 per day).
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agency costs5M or safeguarding the jobs of workers, there seems to be little
reason to defend this aspect of current successorship doctrine.
Yet, it is difficult to formulate an optimal successorship policy. One recommendation which follows from the preceding discussion suggests that the
consequences under the substantial continuity test of retaining a majority of
the predecessor's employees should be relaxed, especially in cases where
there is likely to be considerable variance in the skill or productivity levels of
employees. The majority requirement has been effectively relaxed by courts
choosing an appropriate date to measure the composition of the successor's
workforce.'
But, given the incentives created by the majority requirement, 156 the better route would be to downgrade it as a requirement for successorship status. A possible, less objectionable, modification of the rule
would allow for a finding of successorship status even in cases in which a
majority of the successor's employees were not former employees of the
predecessor, yet where the successor has "skimmed the cream" by hiring the
most skilled, most productive, or most experienced employees of the predecessor. 1 7 While it may be difficult for a court to determine whether a successor retained only the more productive workers, courts could examine
objective factors such as experience, tenure with the firm, and job
classifications.
In this Part of the article we expand on the discussion of successorship
rules presented in Part IV and consider whether successorship doctrine
should constrain the successor employer more or less than it currently does.
Our goal is to suggest an optimal policy based on a more restrictive successorship doctrine.
A.

Rent Appropriation Versus Elimination of Inefficient Employment
Arrangements: Further Considerations

As we have noted, inefficient contractual provisions can be eliminated
under a rule requiring a successor to honor a predecessor's contract.'5 6 Such
a rule requires the party attempting to eliminate the inefficient provisions,
whether successor or predecessor, to compensate the union for agreeing to
the elimination. This exchange is mutually beneficial because eliminating
14 See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (identifying and defining agency
costs).
155 See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 50-51 (1987)

(stating that the employer is in the best position to know when it has hired a majority of
the employees it intends to hire, and therefore knows when and if it has achieved
successorship status).
156 See supra text accompanying notes 140-52.
157 As noted earlier, this proposal may be inconsistent with section 9(a) of the Act
because the successor employer is required to honor the predecessor's labor contract even
though only a minority of the successor's employees were represented at contract
negotiations. See supra note 8.
158 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:821

the inefficient provision increases the value of the firm by more than the
amount expended to compensate the employees.
Although this argument is a straightforward application of the Coase theorem, 5 9 there are situations in which the mutually beneficial transaction
envisioned here is unlikely to take place. As an example, Oliver Williamson ' ° offers the case of a firm in an industry that regulates the entry of new
competitors and prevents or discourages incumbent firms from price competition. 6 ' In such an industry, managers may find that labor unrest is most
easily avoided by sharing the profits that result from regulation with their
employees. Such sharing is likely to involve the adoption of inefficient
employment arrangements because the employees are being overcompensated to ensure industrial peace. The value of the firm's stock could be
increased by eliminating these inefficient arrangements, but assume that the
shareholders are not aware of these potential gains. In the absence of competitive pressures strong enough to force the managers to seek efficiency
improvements, it is unlikely that the typical manager will opt out of this
implicit agreement to share the benefits of regulation with labor. In such a
setting, gains from eliminating inefficient contractual provisions are most
likely to be realized through the intervention of an outside party who is willing to breach the implicit contract with the union. 162 A restrictive successorship doctrine would limit such intervention because the successor employer
will be bound by the predecessor's contract.
Thus, the ramifications of a restrictive successorship doctrine depend on
the competitiveness of the industry in which it operates. In a competitive
industry, managers will have strong incentives to seek efficiency gains
regardless of the prevailing successorship rule. In an uncompetitive industry, however, gains from the elimination of inefficient contractual provisions
may depend on the existence of potential successors seeking to profit by
breaching inefficient agreements between the predecessor employer and its
employees. Thus, in an uncompetitive industry, potential gains from the
elimination of inefficient employment arrangements are less likely to be realized under a restrictive successorship rule.
Although there are uncompetitive industries, it would be a mistake to
adopt a successorship doctrine whose economic justification relies on a presumed lack of competition among firms. Because it would be impractical for
labor courts to determine the competitiveness of an industry or the extent to
which competitive pressures may force managers to seek efficiency gains, we
"I See supra note 109.
160 See Williamson, Comment, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 61-63 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988) (commenting on Shleifer & Summers,
supra note 127).
161 An example is the airline industry prior to deregulation.
162 See Williamson, supra note 160, at 64 (discussing the results of the breakdown of
the noncompetitive environment by deregulation or by the entry of firms that are not
subject to the implicit profit-sharing agreement).
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assume that any successorship rule will be uniformly applied to industries
with varying levels of competition. Even if it could be proven that there is
little competitive pressure on managers to adopt efficient employment
arrangements, it still would not be clear that an unrestrictive successorship
rule would be socially desirable because the benefits of an unrestrictive successorship doctrine would have to be balanced against the social costs generated by a higher frequency of rent-appropriating corporate transfers.
Nonetheless, the perceived benefits of an unrestrictive successorship doctrine depend on whether the lack of competitive pressure to adopt efficient
employment arrangements indicates that gains from the elimination of inefficient arrangements will exceed the social costs generated by rent-appropriating transfers. Although this question has not been answered empirically,
relevant evidence is provided by studies of corporate profitability after a
change in corporate ownership.' 6 If, as the evidence seems to suggest, corporate acquisitions do not generally yield efficiency gains, then the proposition that an unrestrictive successorship rule will result in efficiency gains that
outweigh the social costs of rent appropriation seems less persuasive.
We have argued that sufficiently competitive industries will realize gains
resulting from the elimination of inefficient contractual provisions even
under a restrictive successorship doctrine.' Conversely, it might be argued
that the protection against rent appropriation provided by a restrictive successorship rule can be realized under an unrestrictive rule as well. 6 ' This
protection could result from the bargaining process because the union would
make concessions in exchange for the insurance benefit provided by an
explicit successorship clause in the collective bargaining agreement." 6 The
suggestion, however, that bargained for results will be the same regardless of
163 The evidence from these studies is inconclusive. See, e.g., Franks, Harris, &
Mayer, Means of Payment in Takeovers: Results for the United Kingdom and the United
States, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 223 (A. Auerbach ed.
1988) (comparing acquisitions in the United Kingdom and the United States based on
profitability and means of payment); D. RAVENSCRAFT & F. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELLOFFS, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 210-15 (1987) (finding that "on average, profitability
decline[s] and efficiency losses resulted from mergers of the 1960's and early 1970's").
See generally Mueller, The Effects of Mergers, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
LAW 303-18 (T. Calvani & J. Siegfried 2d ed. 1988) (reviewing several recent studies on

the effects of mergers on the profitability of the acquiring company).
'

See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.

165 See Schwab, Collective Bargainingand the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REV.

245, 266 (1987) (discussing two characteristics of collective bargaining in labor law that
make Coasian bargaining easier to apply).
166 Employees will seek such insurance if they are risk averse. See generally H,
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 108 (1978). If the employees are risk averse they
will pay a premium for this insurance that is greater than the expected "rent
appropriation premium" that could be earned by the predecessor employer upon transfer
of the enterprise. Alternatively, the employees could seek an explicit successorship clause
before taking part in firm-specific training.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:821

the applicable successorship rule is unrealistic because the union is likely to
undervalue the presence of a successorship clause in a collective bargaining
agreement. 1 67 There are two reasons for this undervaluation: informational
disparities and uncertainty about enforcement. Informational disparities
between management and the union render the union unable to accurately
estimate the true value of a successorship clause. Specifically, management's
superior ability to forecast changes in ownership places the union in the position of purchasing a benefit whose value is known only to the employer. To
illustrate how this informational disparity leads to an undervaluation, consider the following examples. A offers to sell B an object that B has never
seen, provided that B offers a reasonable price. Clearly, B's best response is
to start with a very low offer, perhaps zero dollars. If B starts with a higher
offer such as ten dollars, and A immediately accepts, then B will most likely
have overbid.1 68 In bargaining over an explicit successorship clause, the
union is likely to be in an analogous position. The union must estimate the
value of the successorship clause and avoid an initial overvaluation. Further, unless the managers credibly commit to a policy on ownership changes,
almost any final price could be turned into an unfair bargain because the
managers would be free to take actions that would raise the probability of a
1 69
change in ownership.
The second reason that a union is likely to undervalue a successorship
clause is that uncertainty exists as to whether an explicit successorship
clause will be enforced. Generally, an explicit successorship clause is more
likely to be enforced than the boilerplate "successors and assigns" clauses
observed in many collective bargaining agreements. 170 Explicitness, howSee infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
See E. RASMUSEN, GAMES & INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY 251-53 (1989) (arguing that an informationally disadvantaged buyer should
initially bid low to avoid the "winners curse"); see also Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A
Primer, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3-4 (1987) (analyzing the theoretical basis for the winner's
curse).
169 See Hylton & Hylton, supra note 93, at 152-59 (discussing wage concessions in
exchange for safety improvements). In the case of workplace safety, improvements are
usually visible, so that the problem of commitment does not normally arise. When
workers purchase a promise whose value depends on management policy, however, the
commitment problem seems unavoidable.
One might argue that employers will be deterred from reversing an announced policy
on ownership changes by the threat of suits based on common law fraud and negligent
misrepresentation claims. Such claims, however, are likely to be preempted by section
301 of the LMRA. See Dougherty v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 902 F.2d 201, 203-04 (2d
Cir. 1990) (holding that state law claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation are
preempted by section 301); see also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 216-20
(1985) (holding that section 301 preempts an employee's state law claim for breach of
duty to act in good faith).
170 See Estreicher, supra note 128, at 68-69 (stating that.explicit successorship clauses
create more liability for employers than boilerplate clauses); see also In re Martin Podany
167

168
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ever, does not guarantee enforcement. Courts have required that other criteria be met as well.' Thus, the undervaluation problem created by this
situation parallels that of unenforceable promises generally.'7 2 Even if the
union could arrive at an accurate estimate of the value of a successorship
clause, that value would have173to be discounted by the likelihood that the
clause would not be enforced.
One might argue that because the informational disparity noted above
would remain even if the successor employer were required to honor the
predecessor's labor contract,174 the problem of undervaluation is a general
one that cannot be completely solved by altering the background rules governing compliance with labor contracts. This, however, does not take into
account the fact that the nature of the relationship between the employer
and the union changes when the employer must "purchase its way around" a
restrictive successorship rule. The same reasoning that suggests that a union
will tend to undervalue a successorship clause when it must purchase such a
clause from an informed employer, also suggests that a union will tend to
overvalue such a clause when asked to sell it to an informed employer. 75
Assoc., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 659, 661-63 (1983) (holding that employers are liable under
explicit provisions and not under general clauses).
171 The predecessor employer who transfers an enterprise to a nonassuming buyer may
be able to avoid liability under an explicit successorship clause. See Estreicher, supra
note 128, at 69-70, 81-85; see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States Gypsum
Co., 492 F.2d 713, 727 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that an arbitrator's flexibility permits him
"to determine the extent to which the predecessor's labor agreement should be deemed
binding on the successor"); Local 1115 Joint Bd. Nursing Home & Hosp. Employees v. B
& K Investments, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1203, 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (compelling arbitration
to decide what terms, if any, would apply to the successor); Crystal, Successor and

Assigns Clauses: Do They Actually Require that a PurchaserAdopt the Seller's Contract?,
1982 LAB. L.J., 581, 594-95 ("the purchaser's own action.., and not the 'successor and
assigns' provisions... will determine any obligations the purchaser may have").
172 See Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411,
416-24 (1977) (discussing unenforceable promises).
173 The union will undervalue a successorship clause, but the predecessor employer
will tend to overvalue it, that is, discount its cost, if it expects to sell the enterprise to a
successor who can "wriggle out" of the clause. This is because the predecessor can look
forward to receiving a rent appropriation premium when the enterprise is transferred.
See supra text accompanying note 125. One might infer from this that successorship
clauses, although generally illusory, will be observed frequently, and even be urged upon
unions by employers. The problem, however, is that if unions become aware of the
potential worthlessness of successorship clauses under such a regime, they will value
them even less, perhaps finding them worthless.
174 Although the informational disparity may remain, the uncertainty regarding
enforcement would not remain a problem in such a case.
175 Consider the reverse
of the example presented earlier. See supra text
accompanying notes 168-73. Suppose A purchases an object from B, and B does not
know the object's value. B's rational strategy will be to start by asking for a very high
price.
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Under a restrictive successorship rule, the employer will have an incentive to
provide information to the union on the value of the successorship clause
and to offer a commitment with respect to a policy on ownership changes.
B.

Inhibiting the Transfer of CapitalAssets

In NLRB v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services, Inc.176 the Supreme
Court clearly stated its concerns about the effects a restrictive successorship
doctrine might have on the redeployment of capital. 7 We avoided this
issue in the previous discussion, focusing instead on the issues of rent appropriation and the elimination of inefficient contractual provisions. We now
expand the discussion to consider capital transferability.
The implications of successorship doctrine for the transferability of capital
assets has not been adequately explained by the courts. Because of this, one
might think that these implications are unimportant, but this would be a
mistaken conclusion. The most restrictive type of successorship rule-one
that requires the successor to honor the predecessor's contract with the
union-inhibits the transfer or redeployment of capital assets by requiring
the successor employer who purchases the predecessor's assets to hire the
predecessor's labor force as well. This burdens the successor who planned to
use the predecessor's assets in some activity which did not require all of the
predecessor's workers in the capacities determined by the union's contract.
Of course, labor law places burdens on employers in many instances. Why
then, is a rule that requires the successor to "step in the shoes" of the predecessor socially undesirable?
1. Asset Sales
A rule requiring a successor to honor the predecessor's contract will act as
a tax on the transfer and acquisition of capital by making it much harder for
the predecessor to sell the assets of a firm. 7 ' The predecessor will not have
difficulty selling the assets to a successor who plans to use them in the same
way, because the value of the assets will not be greatly affected by the
requirement that the purchaser honor the predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement with the union. Presumably, it will also be easier for the predecessor to sell off its assets in pieces to several firms, because it would be
unlikely that a firm acquiring one of several assets of the predecessor would
be deemed a successor under the doctrine. 1 79 But the value of the predeces176

406 U.S. 272 (1972).

177

Id. at 288 ("Saddling an employer with the terms and conditions of employment

contained in the old collective-bargaining contract . . . may discourage and inhibit the

transfer of capital.").

178 The predecessor could contract around the rule by "buying out" the union's right
to have its collective bargaining agreement pass on to the transferee. This, however, does

not diminish the "tax" effect of such a rule.
179 Of course, this approach may not be feasible if production depends largely on one
asset such as a printing press.
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sor's assets will be sharply reduced from the perspective of a successor who
plans to use these assets in an activity that does not require the same labor
services as those purchased by the predecessor.18s
This is potentially undesirable for two reasons. First, the rule would make
the firm's assets more use-specific by taxing transfers to successors who plan
to use the assets in a very different way. Because, under such a rule, it will
be more difficult for a predecessor to sell his assets for full value, this would
increase the sunk cost of entry into fields in which firms are required to
combine capital-in the traditional form of equipment and structures-and
unionized labor in order to produce. This in turn would reduce the rate of
entry into manufacturing and service industries. Given the extremely
important role of entry in bringing about productive efficiency in a competitive economy, 181 this outcome should be avoided absent countervailing efficiency arguments.
The second undesirable consequence of a rule requiring the successor to
honor the predecessor's contract is that it would tax wealth-creating asset
transfers more heavily than transfers that create little wealth. This is
because transfers of assets into alternative uses occur presumably because
the assets have more value in their alternative uses. Thus, the rule would
reduce the frequency with which assets are transferred into alternative uses
and thereby reduce society's wealth.
One might argue with respect to corporate transfers that occur through
asset sales, that a rule requiring the successor to honor the predecessor's
labor contract provides an efficient form of security. Firms sometimes offer
creditors an interest in capital assets, and such an arrangement is efficient if
the reduction in interest paid to the secured creditor is greater than the
increase in interest paid to other creditors. 8 2 Similarly, an agreement
between the predecessor and the union that requires a successor employer to
180 Note that because we are considering a rule that applies to any asset transfers, this
conclusion does not hinge on the new employer meeting the successorship status
requirement.
181 Perhaps the most important theorem of basic microeconomics teaches that in the
long run competitive equilibrium, economic profits, that is, profits in excess of the
opportunity cost of capital and risk taking, are driven to zero by the entry of new firms.
This process of entry guarantees that goods are produced as efficiently as possible. See R.
LIPSEY, P. STEINER, & D. PURVIS, supra note 101, at 221-24 (arguing that competitive
industry profits signal new capital's entry). Modem industrial organization literature has
emphasized the importance of entry. See J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 119 (1956) (examining the importance of entry and its impact on market competition and
setting forth systematic theory regarding the condition of entry); W. BAUMOL, J.
PANZAR, & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY
STRUCTURE 2 (1982) (arguing that the mere threat of entry can impact both firms'
behavior and the general welfare).
182 See Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:A Review of Current
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 & n.7 (1981) (setting forth hypothetical examples to
illustrate possible ways in which security may be efficient).
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honor the predecessor's labor contract would be efficient if the traded wage
reductions would more than offset the reduction in the value of the predecessor's bundle of capital assets. In this case, the agreement does not tax entry
or the transfer of assets into alternative uses, and by lowering overall production costs, the rule would enhance entry.
Thus, under certain conditions, a rule requiring the successor to honor the
predecessor's labor contract could serve as an efficient form of security.
Indeed, although one never sees this type of express transfer of asset security
interests, more explicit successorship clauses might serve this purpose. The
relevant question, however, is whether the background rule should bind the
successor to the predecessor's labor contract.
A background rule requiring the successor who has purchased the predecessor's assets to honor the predecessor's labor contract would be efficient if
it saved transaction costs by setting initial conditions on which the relevant
parties would agree, provided that they are sufficiently informed.' 83 Admittedly, this proposition generates ambiguity. In certain cases-for example
when the assets are use-specific and cannot be redeployed into some other
activity-a requirement that a successor honor the predecessor's labor contract would have little effect on the value of the predecessor's assets. In such
cases, the wealth-maximizing contract between the predecessor and the
union will contain a successorship clause."8 In other cases, assets may be
potentially valuable if used in other ways, l1 5 so a successorship clause may
lower the value of the predecessor's bundle of assets by more than the value
of the insurance benefit it provides to the employees.
Additionally, when transaction costs are low, the background rule will
have a distributional impact because it will force one party to make concessions in order to move away from the rule. When transaction costs are high,
the rule will result in a loss of societal wealth because some parties will fail
to reach efficient agreements. A background rule requiring the successor
purchaser to honor the predecessor's labor contract will also, for reasons
already given, tax capital asset transfers. A background rule giving the
asset-purchaser freedom to ignore the predecessor's labor contract will tax
unionized employees who seek insurance in the form of security in assets.
I" The Coase theorem implies that the terms that would ordinarily be agreed upon by
sufficiently informed parties would be efficient. Misinformed parties might, however,
agree on inefficient terms. See Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure, and

ProducerLiability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561, 562 (1977) (examining the use of producer
liability as a means to encourage firms to improve their market performance, and arguing
in favor of a two-part system of liability in which firms' liability to consumers
supplements producers' liability to the state).
184 Such a successorship clause would likely be explicit and might be found in cases
where granting a security interest in assets supports a productive investment on the part
of the employees, such as investment in firm-specific human capital.
185 For example, the land on which a gas station sits may generate considerably more
income if used as a parking lot.
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Although this is ultimately an empirical issue, we doubt that a rule requiring the asset-purchaser to honor the predecessor's labor contract would be
socially desirable. Given the importance of asset transfers in bringing about
productive efficiency, society should be reluctant to adopt rules which tax
such transfers. The background corporate law rule governing asset-purchaser liabilities which states that a purchaser of assets assumes no debts or
liabilities that are not expressly transferred, reflects this reluctance.'" If the
background corporate law rule is efficient, then one might be surprised to
find that a contrary rule governs the successor's obligation to honor the
predecessor's labor contract-an obligation which is in relevant respects
similar to a debt owed to any firm creditors.
We do not argue that firms should treat the union as they do any other
creditor, or that the collective bargaining agreement should be viewed as
"just another" contract. Much of labor law seems to address transaction
cost issues' 87 which, although general, arise with enough frequency in the
labor setting to merit special treatment as a separate area in the law.' 8 We
doubt, however, that the relationship between an employer and a union is so
different from that between a firm and a supplier of raw materials that the
rule governing the successor employer's obligations to the predecessor's
employees should be so radically different from the corporate law rule governing asset-purchaser liabilities.
We also note that when granting a security interest in the predecessor's
'86 Authorities have recognized five exceptions to this rule: (1) Where the successor
expressly or implicitly assumes the predecessor's liabilities; (2) where the transaction

represents a de facto merger or consolidation; (3) where the successor is a mere
continuation of the predecessor; (4) where the transaction involves a fraudulent effort to
avoid the predecessor's liabilities; and (5) the "product line exception," which imposes
strict tort liability on the successor for defects in products manufactured and distributed
by the predecessor when the successor continues the product line. See H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, CORPORATIONS, 967-68 (3d ed. Supp. 1983) (setting forth all five
exceptions and noting that courts have divided on the existence of the fifth exception); see
also Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 28-30, 560 P.2d 3, 7-8, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 578-79
(1977) (listing all five exceptions and basing liability on the product-line exception);
Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 1143, 433
N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (1982) (listing the first four exceptions and refusing to hold the
successor corporation liable based on the fifth exception); Grant-Howard Assoc. v.
General Housewares Corp., 115 Misc. 2d 704, 706-07, 454 N.Y.S.2d 521, 523 (1982)
(listing all five exceptions and holding the successor corporation liable based on the
second and third exceptions); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, 18, 434
A.2d 106, 106-07 (1981) (referring to all five exceptions and holding the successor
corporation liable based on the product-line exception).
187 Some examples include strategic behavior and opportunism.
181 See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 94, at 1358 n.34 (setting forth transaction costs
categories differentiating labor from capital markets); see also Williamson, Wachter, &
Harris, supra note 97, at 270-73 (identifying important differences between labor and
commercial arbitration).
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assets supports productive endeavors, such as investment in firm-specific
human capital, some of the benefits will accrue to the employer, and the
employees will not need to offer substantial concessions in exchange for such
an interest. In this case, the background rule which allows the successor to
avoid the predecessor's labor contract will have a relatively small taxing
effect on employees.
Thus, we doubt the efficiency of a background rule that requires the purchaser of assets to step in the predecessor's shoes. To ignore the problem of
rent appropriation because the employer has purchased capital but not labor,
however, elevates form over substance. A successor would pay a premium
for control of the assets of a corporation if there was a relative certainty that
the predecessor's employees could be hired at a discount. In light of this,
there should be some constraints on the ability of the successor employer to
appropriate the employees' rent.
Current successorship doctrine seems to provide a reasonable set of constraints upon changes in corporate ownership which occur through asset
sales, although court opinions have not properly focused on the rent appropriation issue. In the absence of an explicit successorship clause, the successor who gains control through a purchase of assets should not, as a general
rule, be held to the terms of the predecessor's labor contract. A successor
who plans to use the employer's assets in a way that will not require the
same labor services, or, more precisely, will not allow the employer to benefit
from the firm-specific training of the predecessor's employees, should not be
required to step into the shoes of the predecessor. On the other hand, a
successor who attempts to appropriate the employees' rent by purchasing the
same services from them as did the predecessor, but at a lower price, should
be required to bargain with the union.
Determining whether a new employer is able to appropriate the employees' rent, and should therefore be under a duty to bargain, will not be an easy
exercise. Because the courts have already determined a list of factors relevant in successorship analysis,' 89 however, it seems to be a task with which
the courts can be trusted. Although no court has stated that these factors
are to be used primarily to determine whether the successor employer may
attempt appropriation of the employee's rent, rent appropriation theory provides the strongest argument for using such a list of factors. By focusing on
the appropriation problem the courts should be able to avoid an overly rigid
application of these factors.
2.

Mergers and Stock Transfers

There are three reasons why we are reluctant to extend the foregoing efficiency criticisms to corporate transfers that occur through stock purchases
or mergers. First, unlike the case of asset sales, the background corporate
law rule governing the liabilities of a successor who merges with or
189

See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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purchases the stock of a corporation requires that the successor step into the
predecessor's shoes.' 9 This is the background rule because it is probably
efficient. For example, if a bank that loaned a corporation one million dollars had to bear the risk that the corporation's ownership might change and
that the new ownership would want to renegotiate the terms of the loan, it
would obviously charge a higher rate of interest. Further, because the bank
under such a regime would be exposing itself to the risk of opportunistic

actions by managers, there would be no "market clearing" interest rate. 9'
Although it is fairly easy to make out a case for the background corporate
law rule governing the liabilities of a successor who gains control through
merger or stock purchase, a different rule governs collective bargaining

agreements. As a general matter, an entity that purchases a majority of a
corporation's stock and does not make major organizational or structural
alterations will be bound by the existing collective bargaining agreement. 9 '
190 See R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 405-06 (1986) ("Unless transferred or gotten rid
of before the merger, all assets and liabilities of [the predecessor] will become assets and
liabilities of [the successor], by operation of law .... " (emphasis in original)).
191 Just as higher tax rates increase incentives to avoid paying taxes, higher interest
rates increase incentives for managers to act opportunistically. Indeed, because the firm
could be taken over, a potential acquiror would have an incentive to acquire the firm in
order to renegotiate the terms of its debt. But, because this would only increase rates
further and increase incentives to transfer ownership, the equilibrium interest rate would
be driven to infinity.
192 See Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 751 (7th Cir. 1989) ("The successorship
doctrine is simply inapplicable to a stock sale transaction... a corporate entity remains
liable after a stock sale for labor obligations which accrued prior to the sale."); EPE, Inc.
v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that an employer remained bound by
collective bargaining agreement as a "continuing employer," not a successor, after 100%
of its stock was purchased by another corporation); United Food & Commercial Workers
Int'l Union v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that a successor may
escape a duty to recognize the union only if there is genuine doubt about whether the
majority of the bargaining unit supports the union); TKB Int'l Corp., 240 NLRB 1082
(1979) (holding that membership in a multi-employer bargaining unit is assumed by a
stock transferee, and that the transferee is bound by that unit's collective bargaining
agreements); Topinka's Country House, Inc., 235 NLRB 72 (1978) (finding a corporation
to be the same employing entity after stock transfer and bound by the preexisting labor
contract); see also Dicker, supra note 137, at 170 ("since the corporation remains
unchanged after a stock purchase, that corporation is obligated to bargain with the
preexisting union and to adhere to the existing labor agreement"); Estreicher, supra note
128, at 71 ("stock transfers that do not involve a major alteration of the predecessor's
mode of operation do not ordinarily constitute a change in the identity of the employing
enterprise"). See generally Bernstein & Cooper, Labor Law Consequences of the Sale of
Unionized Business, 36 LAn. L.J. 327 (1985) (summarizing buyers' and sellers' duties
under a successorship doctrine after Burns).
A separate but related set of cases involve the alter ego doctrine. Alter ego
transactions are generally sham transactions which involve nothing more than a change
in the name of the corporation. See Haley & Haley, Inc. v. NLRB, 880 F.2d 1147, 1149
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When the successor institutes major alterations, however, the successor is
free of the duty to honor the union's contract. It is under these circumstances that a new owner's responsibilities under the background corporate
law rule differ from the labor law rule for collective bargaining agreements. 193 Further, with respect to mergers, the Wiley court implicitly
rejected the argument that the rule governing the successor's
responsibilities
194
should be the same as the background corporate law rule.
The reason for the existence of a set of background rules that treat agreements with unionized employees less generously than those with creditors of
the predecessor corporation has never been explained. 195 We posit two theo-

(9th Cir. 1989) ("the alter ego transfer is in essence a sham transaction, motivated by the
employer's desire to avoid its contractual obligations"). The test of whether a
corporation is an alter ego varies from circuit to circuit. See Weisman & Rouch, Whose
Ego Is It Anyway? NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 609 (1987)
(arguing that an intent threshold requirement is essential to properly finding alter ego
status); Note, Labor Law's Alter Ego Doctrine: The Role of Employer Motive in Corporate
Transformations, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1024 (1988) (examining different approaches for
reviewing NLRB alter ego findings, and proposing an alternative based on the Fourth
Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable benefit" standard developed in Denzil S. Alkire v.
NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1983)).
193 The general labor law rule will not apply if a significant structural change is made
in the enterprise after the stock transfer occurs. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964) (noting that in cases in which there is a "lack of
substantial continuity of identity," a purchaser will not be bound by a bargaining
agreement); EPE, 845 F.2d at 490 (cautioning that a stock sale will not cause a
corporation to be bound by a labor agreement in cases when substantial changes in an
operation show that there was more than a mere substitution of ownership). When there
is a substantial change in an operation, then successorship principles will govern the new
owner's relations with the labor organization, and the new owner will not be bound to the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. Sometimes the change may be so significant that the
new owner will not be considered a successor and will have no obligations to the union or
the collective bargaining agreement. Id. (citing Lauer's Furniture Stores, Inc., 246
N.L.R.B. 360 (1979)).
There is one special situation in which the general labor law rule will not apply even
though no major alteration in the enterprise takes place. When the stock-purchasing
party is misled by the stock-selling party with regard to the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement, the purchaser will not be bound to the original employment
contract. Esmark, 887 F.2d at 751 n.20 (citing MPE, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 519, 521 (1976)
(holding that the purchaser was not bound by a labor contract because they were told
that the company was between labor contracts when in fact a labor contract currently
existed).
194 This is an implication of the substantial continuity test stated in Wiley. Wiley, 376
U.S. at 543.
195 The Court in Wiley states that "a collective bargaining agreement is not an
ordinary contract." Id. at 550. The Court then states that the collective bargaining
agreement "calls into being a new common law-the common law of a particular
industry or of a particular plant." Id. (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 579 (1960)). This distinction between collective
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ries for treating unions less generously. First, unions have monopoly power
and therefore may extract inefficient or unfair concessions from employers.
Current successorship doctrine enables the new ownership to rid itself of
such labor agreements by structuring the transfer of ownership properly.
This argument, however, does not explain why a union should be treated
differently from other monopolistic entities that sell goods or services to the
firm. Furthermore, competition from other firms provides sufficient incentives to the employer to eliminate inefficient labor contract provisions; the
employer should not need the freedom under current successorship doctrine
to ignore labor contracts in order to have sufficient incentives.
A second, closely related argument for treating unions less generously is
that an employer's labor force usually constitutes a significantly larger fraction of the cost of production than do other inputs. From this perspective, it
might be inferred that the monopoly power problem in the employer's relationship with the union is significantly different than that posed in the
employer's relationship with other monopolistic entities. Besides having
ambiguous implications, this argument contradicts the generally accepted
notion of the relationship between labor's share of the cost of production and
its monopoly power as measured by the elasticity of labor demand. 19 A
larger ratio of labor costs to total production costs will, under certain circumstances, imply a more elastic demand for labor, and therefore less
monopoly power for the union.'7
As the foregoing demonstrates, there are no strong arguments for treating
unionized employees less generously than creditors and other parties with
whom the predecessor is legally obligated. We are inclined, therefore, to
conclude that the efficiency arguments for applying the background corporate law rule to ordinary contracts ought to extend to labor contracts as well.
The second reason we are reluctant to extend the efficiency criticism of a
restrictive successorship rule to corporate transfers that occur through
merger or stock purchases is because by considering assets to be specific to
current use, the successor who merges with or purchases a majority of the
stock of a predecessor would be required to honor the labor contracts of the
bargaining agreements and ordinary contracts was well put by Archibald Cox: "In the
community of the shop the collective bargaining agreement serves a function fairly
comparable to the role of the Federal Trade Commission Act or National Labor
Relations Act in the whole community. It is an instrument of government as well as an
instrument of exchange." Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective BargainingAgreements, 57
MIcH. L. REV. 1, 22 (1958).
Although the Court's distinction between collective bargaining agreements and
ordinary contracts may justify different governing mechanisms, it does not explain why
labor contracts should be governed by a successorship rule that is less generous than the
background corporate law rule.
196 See R. FREEMAN, LABOR ECONOMICS 69-71 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing the
determinants of the elasticity of labor demand).
197 Id. at 71.
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predecessor but wotild not see the sunk costs of entry significantly increased.
Under such a regime, the predecessor can avoid the implicit tax on capital
by selling the assets to a firm that has a different use for the assets and thus
would not be deemed a successor. In this way the new owner would be free
of the obligations imposed by the collective bargaining agreement between
the predecessor and its employees. Furthermore, to the extent that such a
restrictive successorship rule would support the employer's commitments to
compensate workers who undertake firm-specific training-for example, by
removing uncertainty over the enforceability of a "successors and assigns"
clause-there presumably would be benefits that would offset the implicit
tax effect.
The third reason we distinguish mergers and stock purchases from assets
purchases is that the risk of a rent-appropriating transfer is greater in the
case of a stock purchase. This is because by purchasing corporate shares in a
tender offer, control of the corporation can be achieved without management
approval. The transfer of a corporation's assets, however, cannot be accomplished without management approval.' 9" If incumbent managers actively
resist efforts to transfer the wealth of employees, either out of a concern for
their reputations or a genuine sense of obligation, they will be in a better
position to block efforts to appropriate the employees' rent that are

attempted through asset purchases. Accordingly, because of the background
corporate law rule, the ease of avoidance, and the possibility of hostile takeovers, we are reluctant to extend our criticisms to mergers or stock transfers.
C.

Comments on Scope

Successorship issues can arise in cases involving either a transfer of a
majority of a corporation's stock, or a transfer of its assets. In NLRB v.
198 Of course, it is becoming more difficult to transfer ownership through the takeover

device. As of January 1, 1989, anti-takeover statutes existed in 33 states. See Significant
1988 Court Decisions, 44 Bus. LAW. 871, 884 (1989).
Despite the rash of anti-takeover legislation, the threat of hostile takeovers is unlikely
to disappear. First, many states have not passed anti-takeover legislation. Second, firms
may opt out of a given state's anti-takeover protection, either voluntarily or in response to
pressure from shareholders. One obvious way of opting out of state anti-takeover
protection is to reincorporate in a state that lacks such protection. Moreover, in
Delaware, a corporation can exempt itself from the state's anti-takeover statute by having
an opt out provision in its original certificate of incorporation, or by amending the
charter to include such a provision. See id. at 885.
Finally, the rash of anti-takeover legislation may not restrain takeovers as much as
expected because the constitutionality of the most recent legislation, the so-called "third
generation" statutes, has yet to be decided. See Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation,
23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 77, 85 (1988). By "third generation," we refer to statutes
which apply to domestic and foreign corporations. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding an Indiana "second-generation" statute); see also
Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MicH. L. REV. 1635 (1988); Hazen,
supra (discussing the generations of anti-takeover statutes).
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Burns InternationalSecurity Services, Inc.,' former Wackenhut employees
were hired to work for Burns after the incumbent Wackenhut lost its contract to provide security services at a Lockheed plant. Generally, whenever
firms compete for exclusive contracts, facts similar to those in Burns may be
presented. This raises questions concerning whether these cases belong
within the realm of successorship law." Underlying economic factors suggest that this is not a clear-cut issue.
In the context of firm-specific training, facts like those in Burns will not
always present a threat of rent appropriation to the predecessor's employees.
If the employees' rent reflects a return on firm-specific training, 2°1 then a
new competitor in an exclusive service contract ordinarily should not be able
to benefit from the firm-specific human capital investments of the predecessor. For example, if the only type of firm-specific human capital possessed
by a group of workers is experience using a certain type of machinery owned
only by their employer, then another employer should not be able to appropriate the value of such human capital. Further, one should expect that in a
regime in which new employers are not generally bound to continue paying
an employee his previous wage, the employee's return on human capital
2 2
investment will reflect the risk that his employer will go out of business.
Thus, to the extent employees cannot command equivalent wages outside of
the predecessor's firm, they will be compensated ex ante for the risk that the
predecessor's exclusive contract will not be renewed.
This view of firm-specific human capital, however, is probably too limited.
Training is both firm-specific and general, and thus, training may, without
19
200

406 U.S. 272 (1972).
Note that this case is distinguishable in that only the employees are transferred

between enterprises. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Burns argues that successorship
doctrine should not apply to this set of cases. Burns, 406 U.S. at 306-07.
21 See Williamson, Wachter, & Harris, supra note 97, at 256-57 (listing four types of
"task idiosyncracy:" (1) equipment (because the equipment used in one firm will not be
similar to that used in other firms), (2) process (because the employees fashion processes
for specific contexts), (3) informal team accommodations (because mutual adaptation
occurs between employees engaged in recurrent contact which becomes disturbed when
membership is changed), and (4) communication (because employees develop and utilize
information channels and codes that are of value only within that specific firm)).
22 To elaborate, suppose only two employers exist, A and B. A will never go out of
business and pays an hourly wage of two dollars. The probability that B will go out of
business is 50%. If the employees of B have a 50% probability of finding jobs with A
after leaving B, then in order to attract workers B will have to offer a wage of at least
three dollars (solving the equation $2 = (0.5 X 0.5 X $2) + 0.5 X (wage at firm B)).
The point is that if firms compete for workers who are aware of failure risks, and those
workers can choose among firms with different failure probabilities, then failure risks will
be reflected in wages. One could argue that these assumptions are inconsistent with our
arguments concerning employee informational disparities. See supra text accompanying
notes 99-111. However, we seek only to present the case against applying successorship
doctrine to Burns-like fact patterns.
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raising the employee's opportunity wage, raise the worker's marginal product in a competing firm. Alternatively, a new employer may replicate the
predecessor employer's production process.'
By hiring former employees
of the predecessor, the new employer may benefit from the predecessor's
firm-specific human capital investments.
Thus, although rent appropriation is less likely to occur in a Burns-like
fact setting than in the traditional successorship case involving the change of
corporate ownership, the underlying economic considerations do not suggest
that rent appropriation cannot occur in such a setting. There does not seem
to be a strong economic argument for limiting the scope of successorship law
to cases involving changes in corporate ownership. On the other hand, in
this set of cases a rule requiring the successor to honor the predecessor's
contract would be socially undesirable. 4
VI.

CONCLUSION

Successorship doctrine can be simplified and still perform the function of
preventing rent appropriation if there is a successorship rule that requires
the new employer to honor the predecessor employer's labor contract. Recognizing the discouraging effect this would have on capital asset transfers,
however, we propose that such a restrictive rule apply only to changes in
ownership that occur through mergers or stock purchases.
With respect to corporate transfers accomplished through asset sales,
much of the courts' criteria for determining successorship status should
remain. The majority requirement of the substantial continuity test, however, should be relaxed under certain conditions since it provides an advantage to a potential acquiror who plans to retain only a minority of the
predecessor's workforce.
Finally, no strong economic rationale seems to exist for limiting the scope
203 Although this would depend on the type of technology used, it seems that new

employers could replicate many of the task idiosyncracies by hiring a sufficiently large
number of the predecessor's former employees. See generally Williamson, Wachter, &
Harris, supra note 97, at 256-57 (listing these task idiosyncracies).
204 Such a rule would be socially undesirable because of its anticompetitive effects. Cf
Estreicher, supra note 128, at 9 (stating that such a rule would violate "liberty of contract
principles" of labor law).

As for the anticompetitive effects of a rule requiring the new employer to honor the
predecessor's labor contract, note that, in the case of an exclusive contract, the
predecessor would never have an incentive to bargain around such a rule. By restricting
the ability of competitors to submit bids lower than the incumbent's bid, a restrictive

successorship rule would probably provide an enormous benefit to the predecessor
employer. The analogy to this rule would be a horizontal agreement requiring all of the
firms within an industry to pay identical wages. See Lande & Zerbe, supra note 97, at
302-06 (examining the anticompetitive effects of labor contracts); Williamson, Wage
Rates as a Barrierto Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective, 82 Q. J. ECON. 85 (1968)

(arguing that uniform wage agreements may be used to erect entry barriers and secure
monopoly advantages).
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of successorship doctrine to cases which involve transfers of corporate
ownership.
We have proposed a more stringent and simpler successorship doctrine.
Much of our effort, however, has gone into providing a theoretical basis for a
successorship rule. The problem of rent appropriation represents the starting point .for such a rule. In the course of describing the problem that the
relevant law attempts to control, the rent appropriation theory offers the
greatest hope of clarifying and bringing consistency to successorship
doctrine.
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